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Impact assessment on Local Fair Trade Organisations in 
Central America, Africa and Asia  





Despite the rising popularity of Fair Trade, a relatively small amount of academic 
research has been done on its impact on Local Fair Trade Organisations (LFTOs). 
This paper uses a unique set of data from Shared Interest Society Ltd, the UK based 
ethical investment co-operative, of 25 LFTOs across Central America, Africa and Asia 
to make a quantitative assessment of the impact of Fair Trade on them. They have a 
pivotal role as the buyers from the producer households and the suppliers to both Fair 
Trade and commercial buying organisations. The key issues are about the ability of 
LFTOs to achieve an “efficient technology” and diversify into other markets as 
otherwise they are fragile and may not be in a position to serve the interests of the 
producer households in the medium to long term. If they are accessing other markets, 
it suggests they are reaching an efficient technology thereby reducing risk and 
becoming stronger organisations.  The findings suggest, while not confirmed 
statistically, the possibility that LFTOs in the Coffee Market and All Product Markets 
might be reaching efficient technology, able to compete with conventional firms, 
thereby reducing their dependence on Fair Trade markets. It also suggests, while not 
confirmed statistically, the possibility that the Fair Trade Market is helping the growth 
of the Local Market through reaching efficient technology. This study leaves open 
some questions however one option to answer these is rerunning this analysis in 5 
years’ time when more data is available or looking for other avenues where data may 
be available such as Root Capital or FLO. A combined methodology based on the type 
of analysis conducted here with more data, and a case study-based method with a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview of this study 
Despite Fair Trade’s apparent success, it is not just an “anecdotic phenomenon” 
(Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008). There is a large amount of research covering 
impact, economic, marketing, organisational and policy studies. There are a lot of 
different types of players in this market from non-profits to cooperatives and for profit 
organizations. There has been a relatively small amount of academic research done in 
the impact assessments of Local Fair Trade Organisations (LFTOs) also known as 
Intermediate Marketing Organisations (IMOs) which are the intermediaries in the 
value chain.  
 
“[LFTOs] play two principal economic roles, in compensating for a lack of 
competition for labour, and as a channel for investment in tangible and intangible 
assets, in addition to any wider social and political functions” (Hayes 2006).   
 
LFTOs can vary in structure from co-operative to charity or community organisations 
or enlightened employer (Hayes 2006). They can also vary in their objectives and 
ways of functioning (Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008).  
 
This study seeks to fill this gap by using a unique set of data from Shared Interest Ltd, 
UK based ethical investment co-operative of 25 LFTOs across Central America, 
Africa and Asia to quantitatively assessment the impact of Fair Trade on them. They 
have a pivotal role as the buyers from the producer households and the suppliers to 
both Fair Trade and commercial buying organisations. 
 
The key question is “Are LFTOs reaching an efficient technology enabling them to 
compete with conventional firms or are they remaining dependent on Fair Trade?” 
 
The key issues are about the ability of LFTOs to achieve an ‘efficient technology’ and 
diversify into other markets. As otherwise they are fragile and may not be in a 
9 
 
position to serve the interests of the producer households in the medium to long term. 
If they are accessing mainstream markets, it suggests they are reaching an efficient 
technology thereby reducing risk and becoming stronger organisations. If they are not 
and are remaining dependent on Fair Trade further analysis on the causes of this will 
be required along with solutions implemented.  
 
The dissertation is split into 7 chapters: Chapter 1 sets the scene by giving an 
overview of the history of Fair Trade. Chapter 2 looks at dependency theory and Fair 
Trade’s response to criticisms of dependency. Chapter 3 explores the impact of 
mainstreaming on Fair Trade. Chapter 4 focuses on Impact Analysis highlighting the 
gap in the literature which this dissertation addresses. Chapter 5 explains the 
methodology used and Chapter 6 analyses the results. Chapter 7 concludes the 
impacts this research has on our understanding of Fair Trade and the implications this 
has on the Fair Trade movement.   
1.2 What is Fair Trade ?   
It is important to firstly define Fair Trade as it has meant different things at different 
times such as eliminating unfair subsidies and predatory pricing practices (Ehrlich 
2007). 
 
 “Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect that 
seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development 
by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized 
producers and workers—especially in the South. Fair Trade organisations (backed by 
consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in 
campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade” 
(FINE 2001). 
 
The main difference between protectionism and Fair Trade is protectionism is focused 
on protecting the domestic economy whereas Fair Trade is concerned with labour and 
environmental standards (Ehrlich 2010).   
 
It is also important not to confuse Fair Trade with Free Trade which looks at reducing 
trade barriers to increase economic growth of nations with profit the overriding 
10 
 
concern. This is very different to empowering the marginalised (Fair Trade World 
2013).  
 
A Fair Trade Organisation (FTO) also known as an Alternative Trade Organisation 
(ATO) has Fair Trade as part of its mission and at the core of its objectives and 
activities (Fair Trade Glossary 2011). The principles of Fairtrade are based on the 
experience of many FTOs and reflect the diversity of relationships.  
 
Market access for marginalised producers 
There are many producers who are marginalised, especially women and children who 
lack access to mainstream or added value markets, or can only access them through 
lengthy and inefficient trading chains. Fairtrade improves the livelihoods and well 
being of producers by improving market access, shorten trade chains enabling 
producers to receive more from the final selling price. 
 
Sustainable and equitable trading relationships 
Fair Trade relationships takes account of all cost of production with a minimum price 
enabling producers and workers to maintain a sustainable livelihood; one which not 
only meets day-to-day needs for economic, social and environmental well-being but 
also allows improved future conditions.  
 
Capacity building and empowerment  
Fair Trade relationships assist producer organisations to understand more about 
market conditions and trends to develop knowledge, skills and resources to exert more 
control and influence over their lives. 
 
Consumer awareness raising & advocacy 
Fair Trade connects producers with consumers which informing them of the need for 
social justice and the opportunities for change. Consumer support enables FTOs to be 
advocates and campaigners for wider reform of international trading rules, to achieve 






Long Term Relationships 
There is a commitment to a long term trading partnership based on dialogue, 
transparency and respect (Fair Trade Advocacy 2009). 
 
Renard (2003) highlighted that Fair Trade has two visions: firstly to impact the market 
enabling everyone to “maintain a decent and dignified livelihood and develop their 
full human potential” (WFTO 2014); but also to influence the “mainstream 
commercial practices within international exchanges” (Becchetti and Huybrechts 
2008). 
1.3 History of Fair Trade    
Fair Trade has been around since the end of World War II first started by Christian 
groups developing Fair Trade supply chains such as the Mennonite Central Social 
Committee through its ten thousand villages program in 1946 (Ten Thousand Villages 
2014) and SERRV (Sales Exchange for Refugee Rehabilitation and Vocation) 
International selling refugee produced handicrafts in 1949 (SERRV 2014). These 
pioneers were mainly non-profit co-operatives with a focus on conducting trade in a 
fair way, increasing consumer awareness and developing close relationships with the 
Southern producer (Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008). Volunteers sold these products 
from the back of churches until the first formal “Fair Trade” shop was opened in 1958 
in the USA at the same time that OXFAM began selling Fair Trade items in the UK 
and Dutch Catholic group Fair Trade Organisatie (formerly known as S.O.S. 
Wereldhandel) in Holland (Fridell 2004). These volunteers were vital to the growth of 
the movement not just for a sales avenue but for advocating for Fair Trade (Kocken 
2006). This was at a time when there was concern regarding dependency of Southern 
Producers on Northern Consumers. 
 
Fair Trade was one, market-based response to this as it became clear that it was 
necessary to have Fair Trade marketing organisations in the North to provide advice, 
assistance and support to disadvantaged producers in the South. These were 
established and originally it was mainly craft goods that were exported (Fridell 2004). 
Coffee was the first non-craft good exported in 1973 and then tea, sugar, wine, juice 




It became clear that effective certification was needed, this was pioneered in 1988 
when a Dutch priest called Frans van der Hoff and an economist called Nico Roozen 
responded to a call from coffee farmers in Oaxaco, Mexico, "Help is nice, but a fair 
price for our coffee is even better” (Max Havelaar 2014). They developed the first 
Fair Trade label called Max Havelaar in the Netherlands, the coffee was imported 
from the Mexican UCIRI cooperative then roasted and sold in world shops through 
Solidaridad (Max Havelaar 2014). The label and independent verification helped to 
get the Max Havelaar coffee into other retailers such as Dutch supermarkets, soon 
exceeding handicrafts and within a year it had 3% of the market (Kocken 2006, 
Fridell 2004).   
 
The Max Havelaar initiative has been replicated in many other markets: “Max 
Havelaar” in Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and France; Transfair (in Germany, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, the United States, Canada and Japan); “Fairtrade Mark” 
in the UK and Ireland; “Rättvisemärkt” in Sweden; and "Reilu Kauppa" in Finland” 
(Fair Trade Foundation 2014a). 
 
In 1997 the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) was setup to unite the national 
labelling initiatives and now “is a multi-stakeholder, non-profit organization focusing 
on the empowerment of producers and workers in developing countries through trade” 
(Fair Trade Glossary 2011). FLO is responsible for setting international Fair Trade 
Standards but also provides leadership, tools and services needed to connect 
producers and consumers (Kocken 2006). FLO-CERT GmbH is the independent 
Fairtrade certification company which “evaluates Fairtrade certification applications, 
verifies compliance with the Fairtrade Standards during audits, and decides whether 
Fairtrade certification can be granted or not” (Fair Trade Glossary 2011).   
 
The Fairtrade Foundation (FF) is a National Fair Trade Organisation (NFTO) formerly 
known as ‘labelling initiative’ and the UK member of FLO. It is responsible for 
licensing, marketing, business development and awareness raising in a defined 
geographical area (Fair Trade Glossary 2011). FF was set up in 1992 by Oxfam, 
Christian Aid, CAFOD, Traidcraft, World Development Movement, and the National 
Federation of Women’s Institutes. Since its inception it has added eight additional 
members including Shared Interest whose data is the basis of this study. In 1994 the 
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first Fair Trade chocolate and tea was certified in the UK and by 1996 single origin 
and organic Fair Trade coffee was added (Fair Trade Foundation 2014a). 
 
The Fair Trade Mark shown in Figure 1.1 is the most visible sign of FLO. 
 
Figure 1.1 Fair Trade Mark 
  
Source: Fair Trade Foundation (2015a) 
The Fair Trade Mark shows that a product meets the standards of: 
 Fair prices 
 Direct purchasing from producers  
 Transparent and long-term trading partnerships 
 Focus on development and technical assistance via the payment to suppliers of 
an agreed social premium  
(Nicholls et al. 2004) 
In 1998 FLO, World Fair Trade Organisation (WFTO), Network of European 
Worldshops (NEWS!) and European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) created a 
working group called FINE to harmonise Fair Trade standards and guidelines, 
increase the quality and efficiency of Fair Trade monitoring systems, and advocacy 
work. Preparation, hosting and facilitation of meetings rotates between members 
(Nicholls et al. 2004). 
 
In 2004 WFTO, formerly IFAT (International Federation of Alternative Traders), 
created the Fair Trade Organisation (FTO) Mark which is an organisation mark rather 
than a product mark like the Fair Trade Mark. The product market covers agricultural 
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products whereas crafts are covered by the organisation mark. The FTO mark shown 
in Figure 1.2 indicates an organisation meets the World Fair Trade Organisation 
(WFTO) principles which are similar to the FLO principles. Once certified 
organisations are entitled to apply the FTO mark to all of the crafts that they sell 
(Marston 2013).  
Another organisation mark is the Fair Trade Federation logo “that strengthens and 
promotes North American organisations fully committed to Fair Trade” (Fair Trade 
Federation 2014) which is shown in Figure 1.3.  
Figure 1.2 WFTO Mark 
 
Source: WFTO (2013) 
Figure 1.3 Fair Trade Federation Member Logo 
 
Source: Fair Trade Federation (2014) 
The Fair Trade Mark is now the most widely recognised ethical label, a (Globescan 
2011) report of 24 countries shows 60% of consumers recognise it across those 
countries, and in the UK, Ireland, Switzerland, Netherlands, Austria and Finland 9 out 
of 10 consumers who recognise the label trust it. The Co-operative Supermarket has 
switched all its Own Label hot beverages to Fair Trade and Tate & Lyle have switched 
all their retail sugar to be Fair Trade certified. Fair Trade products are available in 
over 125 countries with global sales of €4.8bn in 2012. To put this in perspective, 
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Nestlé’s global sales were $92 billion in 2013, so global Fair Trade sales equate to 5% 
of Nestlé’s (Nestlé 2013a). 
 Fair Trade directly benefits over 1.3 million producers through 1149 producer 
organisations (FLO 2013). When dependants are also taken into account this equates 
to over 7 million people (Varney 2009). 
Chapter 1 has given an overview of this study, defined Fair Trade including a brief 
history. Chapter 2 explores dependency theory and Fair Trade’s response to 




Chapter 2: Dependency Theory 
There are a variety of criticisms made of Fair Trade and the one most relevant to this 
study is dependency. This chapter will look at the theoretical literature from 
economics and the economics of Fair Trade and will then explore the answers that 
Fair Trade has provided to these criticisms.   
2.1 Dependency Theory and Fair Trade 
Fair Trade was developed at a time when there were growing concerns regarding “the 
pace of trade in developing countries” which led to the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 (Kocken 2006). 
 
Here the developed economies agreed to “grant improved market access to exports 
from developing countries” and to “a number of International Commodities 
Agreements … aimed at stabilizing the prices of export products crucial for 
developing countries” (UNCTAD 2014). This led to the replacement of aid with the 
trade and the slogan ‘trade not aid’ being adopted by the Fair Trade movement (Fridell 
2004). 
 
Prior to this the leading economic thinking was that of comparative advantage, first 
mentioned by Adam Smith: “If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it from them with some part of the 
produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage” 
(Smith 1776).  This was then developed by Ricardo (1817) explaining that even 
though it may be cheaper for Portugal to produce both wine and cloth than England, 
Portugal’s comparative advantage is to produce wine as it involves less labour input 
than cloth, and trade cloth with England where cloth involves less labour input. By 
each country focusing on the production of the good or service they have comparative 
advantage with, trade is to the relative benefit of all.  
 
This theory was challenged by Prebisch (1950) in his paper ‘The Economic 
Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems’. He noted a relative 
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deterioration of 36.5% in the prices of primary goods to manufactured goods between 
1870 and 1930 which meant “the peripheral countries transferred to them a share of 
the fruits of their own technical progress”. 
 
This was at the same time that Singer (1950) published his paper ‘The Distribution of 
Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries’ which noted that the 
specialization of underdeveloped countries on export of food and raw materials to 
industrialised countries due to their investment had: 
 
1. Removed most of the secondary and cumulative effects of investment to the 
investment country; 
2. Diverted underdeveloped countries into types of activity offering less scope 
for economic progress;  
3. Reduced the benefits to underdeveloped countries  (Jolly et al. 2004) 
 
Singer found the terms of trade for primary commodity exporters had declined 
between 1876 and 1948 significantly and this had the largest impact on them. The 
explanation he gave for the fall in terms was due to the income elasticity of demand 
for manufactured goods being greater than that for primary goods (Singer 2008). 
 
The combining of their work is known as the Prebisch-Singer Thesis (PST) which 
implies the structure of the market is the reason for the inequality of per capita income 
in the world. This is due to the capitalist system which has existed since the 16 th 
Century and was divided into the First World and Third World, and which “ resulted 
in a transfer of the surplus wealth from the Third World to the First World where it 
was consumed or invested in production” (Fridell 2004).  
 
The market structure came about due to colonialism with Third World countries being 
dependent on First World countries for technology, capital and markets restricting and 
distorting their economic development. PST argued that there is a tendency for the 
results of technical progress in the richer countries to be retained in the form of higher 
incomes, while the benefits of technical progress in the export industries of poorer 
countries result mainly in lower prices (Singer 2008). 
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This thesis grew in popularity over the 1950s and 1960s and provided a justification 
for import substitution policies as: 
“a) Developing countries had to build up a domestic production capacity in order to 
export manufactures 
b) They would find it initially easier to produce for an existing and know domestic 
market than for an unknown global market” (Singer 2008) 
However there were three main issues making it difficult to follow: 
1. Internal markets of small countries were not large enough to support the 
economies of scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low 
2. Political will of the poorer countries as to whether a transformation from being 
primary products producers was possible or desirable 
3. Extent to which poorer countries had control of their primary products, 
particularly in the area of selling these abroad” (Ferraro 2008). 
Because of this mainstream policy it was difficult for countries to shift away from 
agricultural goods towards manufacturing exports (Bruton 1998). 
However later research from Singer (2008) showed that diversification into 
manufactures could create jobs and savings on imports and reduce price volatility 
risk. This depended on the productivity through technical progress of developing 
producers being faster than that of developed producers. This lead to an expansion of 
the PST to “building up technological capacity, entrepreneurial skills, and of ‘human 
capital’ in general. Without such a technological capacity, a shift into manufactures 
requires foreign investment or aid” (Singer 2008). 
2.2. Fair Trade’s Response to Dependency Criticisms 
Following from the above, a significant criticism against Fair Trade is that it 
discourages diversification and structural change causing dependence on low value 
industries and Fair Trade markets. Indeed, some critics have argued that, by 
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guaranteeing a minimum price, Fair Trade ‘makes it harder for people to move into 
other activities’ (Collier 2008). 
LeClair (2002) believes Fair Trade causes “prolonged dependency on low value added 
markets [and hence] retards the diversification of production that is fundamentally 
necessary for the economic advancement of developing countries.” This locks Fair 
Trade farmers into greater Fair Trade dependency and further impoverishes farmers 
outside the Fair Trade umbrella (Chambers 2009). The rationale for this argument is 
that the guaranteed above-market price provided by Fair Trade gives an incentive for 
individuals to focus on these despite there being poor economic prospects for these 
goods in the long run (LeClair 2002). This coupled with the dependence on Fair Trade 
markets would mean severe repercussions to producers if anything were to happen to 
these markets.  
2.2.1 No other options in the short to medium term 
However it is clear from the literature that for some producers they have no option in 
the short to medium term but to work in low value sectors. However, these develop 
their financial, physical, human and social capital (Wood 2003, Smith 2013). 
From the literature there are three options open to increasing income: 
1. Improving efficiency or increasing quality 
2. Upgrading in an existing value chain 
3. Moving into higher value chains 
2.2.2 Improving efficiency or increasing quality 
“We develop long term relationship and encourage farmers to improve their quality at 
every stage of the farming cycle…because of frustration at the failure to differentiate 
quality within the Fair Trade market” (Union Coffee Roasters 2013).  
 
Since the beginning of the Fair Trade movement there have been questions around the 
quality of the products. Union Coffee is an interesting example as they were involved 
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early on in the Fair Trade movement and still sell some Fair Trade coffee but have 
moved away from it due to quality concerns (Union Coffee 2014). 
 
The main criticism is based on conventional market pricing coffee on quality whereas 
Fair Trade coffee is aggregated together. “A farmer has two bags of coffee to sell and 
there is a Fair Trade buyer for only one bag. The farmer knows bag A would be worth 
$1.70 per pound on the open market because the quality is high and bag B would be 
worth only $1.20 because the quality is lower. Which should he sell as Fair Trade 
coffee for the guaranteed price of $1.40? If he sells bag A as Fair Trade , he earns 
$1.40 (the Fair Trade price) and sells bag B for $1.20 (the market price), equalling 
$2.60. If he sells bag B as Fair Trade coffee he earns $1.40, and sells bag A at the 
market price for $1.70, he earns a total of $3.10. To maximize his income, therefore, 
he will choose to sell his lower quality coffee as Fair Trade coffee” (Haight 2011).   
 
Haight (2011) suggests a possible solution is by grading Fair Trade coffee. For each 
grade of coffee the same premium of $0.20/lb could be added ensuring higher quality 
coffee to the consumer and increased income to the coffee producer.  “Today, 96% of 
the $14 billion coffee market is regular coffee and only 4% is Fair Trade certified … 
grading an extra 4% of output can’t be an insurmountable obstacle” (Burnhill 2013). 
However there is still the practical question of who would be responsible for this and 
how this would work in practice? It would involve a lengthy dialogue from all the 
stakeholders currently involved with input from organisations such as SSCA 
(Specialist Coffee Association of America) and SCAE (Specialist Coffee Association 
of Europe) and would increase the costs of production.  
 
Union Coffee rather than adopting this have helped develop a concept called ‘Direct 
Trade’ which focuses on speciality coffee with direct relationships with the buyer and 
seller not involving third party accreditation. The rationale for this is “We are excited 
by exceptional quality which is created at the farm. This demands collaboration 
between farmer and roaster to understand the specific demands of each producer” 
(Union Coffee 2014). 
One option open to LFTOs to increase income is by improving efficiency or 
increasing the quality of the final product (Lall 2001). One of the ways Fair Trade 
21 
 
helps them to do this is by stipulating 25% of the Fair trade premium must be spent on 
improving quality (Fair Trade Foundation 2014b). Some Fair Trade buyers even pay 
additional premiums over the Fair Trade premium which can be used to improve 
quality such as The Co-operative Group in the UK with Fair Trade wine (The Co-
operative Group 2014). 
Fair Trade buyers can also help LFTOs overcome quality problems in other ways. 
Kagera, a Coffee Cooperative in Kenya has been helped through agricultural 
technicians (Clifford 2013). By improving the quality of the products they can obtain 
higher prices, an example being Gumutindo who have developed a gourmet product 
which is sold as a single source coffee by Cafédirect (Gumutindo 2006). 
  
Fair trade premiums have also been used to increase efficiency of their processes, 
45% of cocoa premiums in 2011 were used for this (Fair Trade Foundation 2014c). 
One of the more innovative examples of this is APPBOSA (Asociación de Pequeños 
Productores de Banano Orgánico Samán y Anexos), a banana LFTO in Peru which 
has developed a cableway to transport their bananas to their processing plant rather 
than farmers having to carry them (FLO 2014a). 
Fitter and Kaplinsky (2001) feel the coffee market has an enormous potential to be 
differentiated. This is due to coffee being similar to wine and mineral water which 
were also marketed as relatively undifferentiated products decades ago, but are now 
sold as highly differentiated lines with significant premiums. This is already 
beginning to happen with importers paying up to 10 times the Fair Trade price for 
speciality coffee in some cases (Macatonia 2014). Café Peru, a Peruvian Coffee LFTO 
has focused solely on specialty coffee export markets of the USA, Germany and Costa 
Rica (Café Peru 2006). However for specialty markets quality has to be very high; 
this is one of the reasons it has been hard for LFTOs to break into the specialist cocoa 
market. However this is being rectified with new tress being planted and agricultural 
training given to farmers (Fair Trade Foundation 2012c). COCLA (Central de 
Cooperativas Agrarias Cafetaleras) saw this opportunity and has invested in a 
chocolate plant to meet USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) standards so 
they could export to North America and Europe (COCLA 2006).    
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2.2.3 Upgrading in an existing value chain 
Another option available to producers to increase their income is by upgrading in their 
existing value chain (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003).  
A good example is the coffee market, traditionally there have been many actors in the 
coffee value chain shown by Figure 2.1. Some of the most controversial are 
intermediaries sometimes known as ‘middle men’ or ‘coyotes’ often taking advantage 
of isolated coffee farmers who may lack knowledge of prices, transport or just need 
the cash (CRS 2012).  
Figure 2.1 Coffee Value Chain 
 
Source: CRS (2012) 
Fair Trade enables farmers to bypass middle men by being part of a co-operative so 
they can gain knowledge of market prices, pool together for transport and receive pre-
financing. 
However there are other stages in the value chain, full processing alone on average 
costs $1.25 per kilo of coffee (Kazoora 2011). So if LFTOs were able to do even part 
of this processing in house they would significantly increase the percentage of the 
final consumer price they receive. Figure 2.2 shows the different stages of the coffee 
process and the difference between wet and dry processing. Dry processing is known 
for enhancing body and complexity, whereas wet processing enhances clarity and 
acidity. In Nepal, Subedi (2011) found the cost benefit ratio for dry processing is 
thought to be higher at 1.4 than wet processing at 1.2. The choice of process chosen 
was dependent on knowledge, training, quality of capital supplied and finance.  
A good example of dry processing is CECOCAFEN (Coffee Cooperatives Central 
Association in Northern Regions), a Nicaraguan coffee LFTO. They purchased the 
SolCafe processing plant in 1999 which included drying beds and sorting machines 
which also improved the quality of coffee (CECOCAFEN 2006).   
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Figure 2.2 Wet and dry coffee processing flow chart 
 
Source: FAO 2014 
A good example of wet processing is COPROCAEL (Cooperativa De Productores 
De Café La Encarnación Limitada), a Honduran coffee LFTO. They process all of 
their coffee “on a central wet mill using aquapulping, an eco-friendly substitute for 
the normal pulp, wash, & ferment procedure in traditional wet processing” (Higher 
Grounds 2014)  In addition the by-product of coffee washing is pulp which can be 
used for composting which can improve coffee quality (Kazoora 2011). 
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Another market where there is potential to significantly increase income from 
processing is fruit. A good example is Cercle des Secheurs (CDS) in Burkina Faso 
which have moved into dried fruit and juices due to the low prices being paid for 
unprocessed fruit (CDS 2012).  
Access to space on container ships can be an issue for some LFTOs especially fruit 
companies due to conventional competitors owning them. The costs involved in 
setting up their own importer are out of reach for the vast majority of LFTOs but 
would reduce costs and improve the percentage of the retail price they received. 
Agrofair has bridged this gap, it is owned half by the producers and half by 
Solidaridad a Dutch development NGO. LFTOs are receiving between 40% and 80% 
more than world prices. Agrofair has also allowed LFTOs to access markets they 
would never have been able to previously. Agrofair has also increased the range of 
products they export starting with bananas in 1996, followed by mangos in 2002 and 
Pineapples in 2003 (Agrofair 2015). Bananas are an oligopolistic market dominated 
by 5 Transnational companies (TNCs) controlling 75% of the world market due to the 
vertical integration of plantations, shipping and distribution and achieve significant 
economies of scale (Chambron 2010).  
Shipping can also be very expensive for coffee averaging $15,000 per container 
(Weber 2007). Vertical integration across the entire coffee supply chain is rare, one 
exception is Rogers Family Coffee but even then only 10% is fully integrated with the 
“rest that isn’t grown on their farms, varying levels of integration exist” 
(Neuschwander 2014). This is it due to it requiring new, specialised knowledge and 
major investments which carry significant financial risks. If LFTOs are able to 
remove other steps in the value chain this can be even more beneficial. Such as 
CECOCAFEN who have also installed a fully equipped cupping laboratory which 
allows aromas and regional flavours to be distinguished which can then be marketed 
for higher prices in the speciality markets. (CECOCAFEN 2006).    
 Although upgrading in an existing value chain can help companies reduce costs and 
improve efficiency however it is not cheap or easy.  Integrating some parts of the 
chain e.g. a farm building a mill is more common than full integration. The most 
common reason for integration is increasing control e.g. processing techniques to give 
a higher quality product with some like Rogers Family Coffee constantly innovating 
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and trying new techniques with their mills which if they work they replicate. It’s 
interesting within coffee virtually no company has the technical expertise to take over 
the shipping part of the value chain as its extremely expensive except on vast 
economies of scale of multiple commodities that aren’t seasonal (Neuschwander 
2014). Most integration in the coffee industry is backward as they are receiving the 
higher percentage of the retail price and can afford to take the financial risk.  
Another example of LFTOs coming together is Pachamama, based in the US it is 
100% owned by LFTOs in Peru, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico and Ethiopia. “The 
vision was to create a global coop brand that farmers own and control. It would focus 
on a direct connection to consumers” (Kubota 2014). Their strategy was vertical 
integration by firstly selling directly to food cooperatives, which grew to distribution 
into about 60+ food co-ops nationwide. Then in 2012 they opened an office 
space/outlet store in Sacramento followed by the 2014 opening of their first cafe in 
Davis, California and now exploring more retail locations. 
Mchinji Area Smallholder Farmers’ Association (MASFA) is another example of an 
LFTO which has upgraded in its existing value chain by processing ground nuts into 
oil locally and exporting it via Twin Trading directly to UK supermarkets. They have 
also developed a community buying centre that includes an office and warehouse, 
which when not being used can also be hired out bringing in additional revenue 
(Smith 2013).  
If LFTOs are able to bring processing more locally it can enable them to access local 
markets. A good example is Just Trading Scotland (JTS) which has invested directly 
in Kaporo Smallholder Farmers’ Association (KFSA), a Malawian rice producer. 
Their rice cleaning and bagging was previously done in the UK, but by moving it to 
Malawi they have improved the amount of value add and improved the quality of the 
product (Smith 2013). 
Hayes (2006) found that Fair Trade provided the means for diversification, “both by 
the individual household through education, and by the local Fair Trade organization 
with its greater access to product and credit markets and its potentially wider scope 
for profitable investments further down the value chain or in different markets”. 
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2.2.4 Moving into higher value chains 
Moving into higher value chains is another option open to LFTOs to increase their 
income. The FLO producer business unit has a key role here in helping identify value 
added propositions such as ecotourism. There are many examples of diversification in 
the Fair Trade market such as into other agricultural markets. An example is the 
National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM) which was 
dependent on tobacco and maize but has moved in to higher value agriculture like 
birds eye chillies and groundnuts (ACDI 2000). They have since also developed the 
NASFAM Training and Development Institute provide both general and tailored 
training and consultancy services to meet specific client needs in areas from 
Organisational Development to Board Governance (NASFAM 2014). 
 
Another interested example is COOCAFE, traditionally a coffee LFTO which has 
moved into higher value agricultural sectors such as ornamental plants and flowers. 
They have also moved into manufacturing of handicrafts in their own shop and have 
developed new markets through creating their own website and developed agro-
ecotourism (Fair Trade Foundation 2006). 
 
Another LFTO that is further along the eco-tourism route is Makaibari, a tea estate in 
Darjeeling. They achieved this firstly through a lodge guesthouse. The second stage 
was hosting additional guests in workers’ homes. This started with 13 families in 2005 
and has now increased to 21 families who charge $25 per couple per day. It is hoped 
this will increase tea sales and one day will be extended to all households. Makaibari 
also have other ideas for diversification such as a computer centre which could lead to 
other higher income exports (Banerjee 2008, Makaibari 2014).  
2.2.5 Efficient Technology 
Hayes’ (2006) analysis suggests the main benefit of the Fair Trade partnership to the 
producer household is in the process of investment in equipping the local organisation 
with an efficient technology, i.e. in creating and maintaining the ability of the local 
organisation to compete in the product market. 
For an LFTO to compete in a market requires that a firm has an efficient technology, 
this is, the optimal allocation resources and technical efficiency short-run marginal 
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cost and long-run average cost are no greater than the market price. Fair trade can 
help LFTOs reach minimum efficient scale and overcome uneven production 
including “customer, supplier and management failure, equipment down-time, 
climatic problems and other hazards, both insurable and otherwise” Hayes (2006).  
LFTOs must aim to become equipped to compete independently in the product 
market, since the buyer cannot given an open-ended and permanent commitment to 
purchase irrespective of the demand conditions in the buyer’s own markets, and 
should be explicit as to how the trading relationship may end at some point (Hayes 
2006). Otherwise LFTOs are fragile and may not be in a position to serve the interests 
of the producer households in the medium to long term. It is interesting to note that 
most LFTOs have received “grant assistance from government and non-government 
agencies at some point in their development, and have reached their present strength 
only after a long period of struggle” (Hayes 2006). 
In summary, to survive LFTOs need to reach efficient technology which requires 
significant investment in financial, physical, human and social capital. 
2.2.6 Financial Capital 
Fair Trade is known by many for helping improve the financial position of producers 
through minimum prices being above the conventional market. With producers being 
able to request up to 60% from buyers paid in advance of delivery (FLO 2014b), Fair 
Trade also assists with working capital management.  
 
This is very different from traditional buyers, for example artisans are usually 
dependant on the buyer of finished products to provide materials which is often at a 
price that makes the produce uncompetitive to other buyers. However if they had the 
financial capital to buy their own materials they would not be dependent on them, 
thereby reducing their average cost of production and enabling them to sell at a 
competitive price to other buyers. Finance is also important for food LFTOs as they 
require finance for seeds and fertilizers every harvest and, like artisans, they may also 
be tied to those they sell their products to (Hayes 2006). 
 
LFTOs require a range of financial products including: savings; leasing; pre-finance; 
pre-harvest working capital; trade finance; term finance; guarantees; equity; 
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insurance.  Pre-finance is one of the most accessible financial products, other financial 
products are limited with term finance being very limited and insurance is extremely 
limited. Financing accessibility is dependent on the product with pre-finance the most 
accessible for coffee (Nicholls et al 2004).  
 
Cash flow is very important for all businesses with many businesses failing due to 
lack of cash despite being profitable. Some crops such as bananas, cut flowers and tea 
are grown year round providing continuous cash flow. However other crops such as 
coffee are seasonal and require short term financing to pay for inputs such as seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides, transport and labour until harvest. 
 
For Dukunde Kawa a coffee LFTO in Rwanda “Pre-financing is still one of our 
biggest challenges as loans don’t come from the banks on time, and farmers want to 
deliver their coffee early and get paid. Some buyers only pay once their coffee is at 
port so farmers have to wait a month for payment but it’s much better if we can pay 
them immediately. We could also help shift microloans out to farmers” (Osborne 
2010). This is a problem for many LFTOs as they are only able to sell a certain 
percentage of their crop into these markets which could be as low as 8% of their crop 
with the rest being sold in the conventional markets (Riedel et al. 2005). 
 
They also require longer terms finance to improve quality and productivity.  
 
“91% of Fair Trade producers have unmet financial needs… This holds back 
productivity and product quality, as well as the farmers’ capacity to adopt better 
technologies, build their business, and preserve the local environment” FLO (2014a). 
 
Banks restrict lending to LFTOs as they find it hard to assess the risk of their 
members, the members also lack property rights preventing them from using their 
land as collateral. Members are also often dispersed across a large area meaning high 
transaction costs and it may take a long period for loans to be repaid (Nicholls et al. 





Other options open to finance LFTOs include the Fair Trade International Global 
Producer Finance Unit (GPFU) which is helping LFTOs in providing relevant and 
reliable credit profiles and disseminating these to potential finance providers, as well 
as supporting financial institutions in pioneering and developing services especially in 
investment finance. They also work on specific projects in areas where there are 
specific bottlenecks in commodities and countries (FLO 2014b). 
 
FLO have recently added two programmes to further help producers with financing: 
 
 Fair Trade Access Fund of $8-12 million which provides agricultural LFTOs 
in 42 countries with longer-term loans and technical support via mobile 
phones.  This was launched in conjunction with Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation which links US organisations in this case Incoﬁn Investment 
Management and Grameen Foundation (OPIC 2014).   
 
 The Africa Agriculture Trade Investment Fund for African for African 
producers of €85 million in conjunction with German development bank, KfW 
and managed by Deutsche bank (FLO 2012). 
 
 Another important component of the Fair Trade movement is the social 
premium, “an additional sum of money paid on top of the Fair Trade minimum 
price that farmers and workers invest in social, environmental and economic 
developmental projects to improve their businesses and their communities. 
They decide democratically by committee how to invest the premium” (Fair 
Trade Foundation 2014c). 
 
 Some LFTOs have used these for microfinance programs. This enables 
households to build up cash reserves as insurance funds and thereby reduce the 
demand for distress borrowing. Also many households do not have the 
collateral to access formal credit institutions and these microfinance 
organisation provides small loans at rates that make production more 




  Bananeras de Uraba, a Colombian Banana and Plantain Producer offers 
microfinance to their employees to help start small business to create 
additional sources of income. They partner with the National Learning Service 
to provide skills-building programmes and this has led to businesses being 
created ranging from leather production to cake baking. Other uses of this 
social premium have been loans for education and or for home ownership 
(Bananeras de Uraba 2014). 
 
There are other lenders to LFTOs ranging from semi-formal lenders including Credit 
unions to Co-operatives like Oikocredit which provide medium and long term loans, 
equity investments and capacity building to LFTOs in close to 70 countries 
(Oikocredit 2013) and Shared Interest whose data is the basis of this study. 
 
2.2.7 Shared Interest Case Study 
Shared Interest was started in 1990 by “a group of Fair Trade pioneers with a vision of 
a new way of investing money to reduce poverty. They created a financial cooperative 
with the aim of using the members’ pooled capital to lend to disadvantaged producer 
groups in the developing world.” It is the world’s only 100% Fair Trade lender, 
maintaining values based on love, justice and stewardship with an all-inclusive 
approach to cultures and religious beliefs (Shared Interest 2012). 
 
It is set up as a community benefit society and “was originally launched in 1990 with 
the financial backing of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Ecumenical 
Development Co-operative Society” (Shared Interest 2014). Their funding today 
comes through supporters’ investments who lend between £100 and £100,000 each 
and get a return currently of 0.5% interest annually. There are 9000+ UK based 
lenders, and funds are placed into a central pot lending over £33 million countries to 
97 producer groups in 24 countries (Shared Interest 2013). 
 
For a number of years they have been increasing the proportion of directing lending to 
producers, which is why they have set up satellite offices in Kenya, Peru and Ghana. 
This enables them to better “create the right environment for Fair Trade to take 




Shared Interest diversify their risk by working with a variety of producers such as 
Candela, a Brazil nut producer which also produces candles and oil, and Craft Aid 
Mauritius which sells clothing and cotton bags, greeting cards, and Fair Trade sugar 
(Candela 2006, Craftaid 2012).  
 
To qualify for lending producers must have at least three years of audited accounts. 
Shared Interest does not require any security for loans and lend in US Dollars, British 
Pounds and Euros only on Fair Trade contracts. It supports LFTOs with short and 
long term funding with flexible repayment (Shared Interest 2014). 
 
Short Term Funding (Up to 12 months) 
Export credit is a pre-finance facility which provides capital to enable producers to 
complete and deliver new orders or contracts. As orders are received from buyers, 
they can draw down working capital against these orders, up to 60% for commodities 
and 80% for handicraft producers.  
For existing customers they also provide a stock facility to build up stock prior to 
fixing sales contracts up to $200,000 and pre-harvest loans to maintain or improve 
crops, for example, to purchase fertilizers (Shared Interest 2014). 
Long Term Funding (1-5 years) 
Shared Interest provides term loans to purchase infrastructure such as machinery or in 
other ways such as financing exhibitions (Shared Interest 2014). 
 
Practical Support (1-5 years) 
Shared Interest also provides practical support through its charitable Foundation. This 
helps LFTOs to understand the expectations of social lenders like themselves through 
their access to project finance. LFTOs also benefit from their business skills training 
and mentoring projects in Swaziland, Rwanda and South Africa. They have helped 
producers reflect costs in their pricing, rebrand businesses to highlight their unique 





There are some interesting case studies of how Shared Interest has been able to help 
LFTOs, such as financing CECOCAFEN (Coffee Cooperatives Central Association in 
Northern Regions), a Nicaragua cooperative. A key struggle for this organisation in its 
early days was obtaining credit for members due to banks being unwilling to provide 
credit which is vital for producers to cover production costs until harvest.  
 
Finance was particularly important to Candela, a Brazil nut producer in Brazil when 
the Brazil nut market collapsed in 2002. They would have been unable to survive 
without finance from Shared Interest which enabled them to develop a natural oil 
from Brazil nuts (Osborne 2010).  
 
2.2.8 Physical Capital 
Financial capital has also enabled physical capital to increase. Physical capital refers 
to a factor of production such as machinery, buildings, or computers (Krugman et al. 
2013).  
This is very important as many producers are very remote with limited access to 
transport or market information and may depend on local middlemen to buy their 
produce and receive only a fraction of the real value.   
North West Bee Keepers, a Zambian honey and beeswax LFTO was lacking the 
infrastructure to differentiate the types of honey or transport it without negatively 
affecting quality (Fair Trade Foundation 2013a). The solution to this was to invest in 
four wheel drive vehicles, buckets and honey presses to transport the honey 
effectively despite them being spread out over 1,200km (Tropical Forest 2013).   
“This may be relatively small part of the initial investment, becoming of major 
importance only as the minimum efficient scale of the production increases” (Hayes 
2006).  
However for MASFA, they required significant investment due to suffering from 
antifloxin infection in their groudnuts which closed developed markets. This was 
provided by CORDAID partnering with commercial agricultural company Ex Agris 
and environmental trust Waterloo Foundation to build a groundnut processing plant 
33 
 
with an antifloxin laboratory. This has reopened those markets but also open local 
ones as they can now produce ready-to-use therapeutic food which is used for 
malnourished children and HIV/Aids patients as well as peanut paste to local 
producers (Smith 2011, Smith 2013). 
By investing significantly in financial capital for the new machinery, Cafédirect has 
been able to break into the lucrative single use coffee pod market which is growing by 
39% a year, by developing Nespresso compatible pods. They have also invested 
significantly in human capital to develop the process and choose the right coffee. 
(Guardian 2014a). 
2.2.9 Human Capital 
However financing without successful leadership can be a recipe for disaster shown 
by Ucraprobex who received substantial overseas aid which did not lead to good 
business skills; loans were borrowed to reconstruct the coffee fields with little 
understanding of the long term liability or effect on the business. This has led to their 
coffee not being of the highest standard (Ucraprobex 2006). 
 
“Improving their health, education, and nutrition is not only intrinsically important in 
enhancing their capabilities to lead more fulfilling lives but it is also instrumentally 
important in increasing their  “ ‘human capital’' with lasting influence in the future” 
(Anand and Sen 2000)  
 
The benefits of Fair Trade have not just been increased financial and physical capital 
but also human capital. Human capital is the stock of competencies, knowledge, 
habits, social and personality attributes, including creativity, cognitive abilities, 
embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic value (Krugman 
et al. 2013). 
 
There has been a variety of investment in human capital from Fair Trade USA 
delivering management training to 180 coffee LFTOs in Latin America and East 




Lack of access to education is a serious barrier to human capital being developed. “33 
million primary school-aged children in Sub-Saharan Africa do not go to school… 
 approximately 40% of Africans over the age of 15, and 50% of women above the age 
of 25 are illiterate” (Achieve in Africa 2009). 
Prior to Fair Trade the low commodity prices meant LFTOs members struggled to 
feed their families and pay medical and school fees, ‘a major reason for children 
being taken out of school to contribute to the family income by working on the farm 
or in the informal sector’ (Fair Trade Foundation 2012d).  
A good indication in the different the Fair Trade price has made to these LFTOs is by 
comparing the Fair Trade minimum price and the conventional market price. An 
example is Robusta Coffee between 1989 and 2013 shown by Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 Robusta Coffee Market 1989 - 2013: Comparison of Fairtrade price 
and London LIFFE price 
 
Source: Fair Trade Foundation (2010) 
 
Many LFTOs have seen the impact these low prices had on human capital. This is 
why Satemwa, a tea producer in Malawi has been used their social premium to 
provide adult literacy classes to improve human capital (Frank et al 2012). In Chapter 
3 this study looks at the Chamraj Tea Estate which provides free education for all 
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workers’ children from primary to junior college where both management and 
labourers’ children are educated together leading to upward mobility. 
 
Bloom et al (2004) highlight that most empirical studies narrowly define human 
capital to education. However, health is clearly an important factor to this as increased 
health enhances the ability to learn (Taras 2009).  
 
Neilson et al (2009) looked at the Quality Upgradation Plan for tea producers in 
Southern India where the combination of teaching careful plucking alongside 
processing tea in their own factory at Upashi Krishi Vigyan Kendra (U-KVK) 
significantly increased the price received. This was a very strategic response of 
improving quality to the tea crisis. Originally it was a pilot that has now been 
expanded by the Tea Board to 88 locations through “subsides of 50% of the cost of 
upgrading equipment and gaining ISO9001 and HACCP certification”. This provided 
a major injection of new ideas and the entire community has realised the importance 
of quality in tea. New ideas can have a large impact e.g. by intercropping Coconuts 
with Cocoa, this can increase Coconut output and produce an additional revenue 
stream from Cocoa (Magat 2007).  
 
However this often requires technical assistance which some Fair Trade buyers 
provide such as Traidcraft funding a project for Cotton producers in Kenya to 
intercrop cotton with cowpeas, pigeon peas and green grams (Traidcraft 2015).  
 
The Shared Interest Foundation provide business skills training and mentoring 
through projects in Swaziland, Rwanda and South Africa and have created a Best 
Practice Project to join them all together. They have involved establishing local 
business support networks and helping them to become self-sufficient. These have 
helped producers reflect costs in their pricing, rebrand businesses to highlight their 




2.2.10 Social Capital 
Social capital is also an important factor and the effective management of social 
networks has been of fundamental importance to the growth of Fair Trade (Davies & 
Ryals 2010).  “A balanced portfolio of customers, suppliers and production methods is 
of crucial importance to the management of both insurable risk and uninsurable 
uncertainty” (Hayes 2006).  Producers that are able to differentiate themselves by 
becoming Fair Trade certified are also attractive to buyers looking to position 
themselves as ethical and social (Doherty and Meehan 2006). 
LFTOs developing direct, personal, long-term relationships with buyers helps them 
develop management skills, and increase production capabilities (Lee 2014). 
Marketing is particularly important for non-traditional exports and Twin Trading’s 
experience of building Divine Chocolate was especially helpful with MASFA 
developing the liberation nuts brand for their ground nuts (Cramer 1999, Smith 2013). 
Country level producer gatherings by Fair Trade USA have been helpful for this as 
they brought along US companies who placed orders, NGOs to help with capacity 
building services and social lenders to provide financing (Fair Trade USA 2012).  
Raynolds (2004) concludes it is the capacity building nature of Fair Trade that will 
prove the most important in fuelling sustainable development in the long run. This is 
often achieved through workshops and direct personal assistance such as Co-operative 
Coffees which is a roaster co-operative in the US & Canada and which sends staff out 
for one-to-one training (Lyon 2008, Ruppell 2013). This improves LFTOs access to 
local, regional, international and mainstream markets which reduces dependency (Lee 
2014). 
Most of the studies cited above are anecdotal and there have not been enough impact 
studies to answer the question as to whether they are a direct result of Fair Trade’s 
positive features or merely an accident, or whether LFTOs themselves, realising that 
Fair Trade can create dependency, have sought to reduce any dependency themselves. 
The gap in this literature is the reason for this study being undertaken. 
Chapter 3 examines the issues concerning mainstreaming, a major feature of Fair 
Trade’s own development in recent years, as Fair Trade products have entered 
mainstream marketing channels. 
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Chapter 3: Mainstreaming 
One of the key questions for the Fair Trade movement is whether mainstreaming is 
the future or whether it has just sold out to the practice of the conventional market.   
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the pioneers of the Fair Trade movement were mainly non-
profit co-operatives with a focus on conducting trade in a fair way, increasing 
consumer awareness and developing close relationships with the Southern producer 
(Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008). 
 
The introduction of mainstream companies to Fairtrade was started by Cafédirect 
retailing in supermarkets in the UK and Switzerland in the early 1990s (Bornhofft 
Moore 2010).  This was followed by Starbucks getting accreditation for its coffee in 
2000 (Starbucks 2014). Then, in 2000, Divine Chocolate Company undertook a joint 
branding exercise with Comic Relief and then the Co-operative Group. In 2002 the 
Co-operative Group and Starbucks converted all their own-brand chocolate to Fair 
Trade (Nicholls et al. 2004). In 2003, Procter & Gamble certified their first coffee 
brand (Locke et al. 2010). In 2005, Walmart, Nestlé and Tesco were licenced to carry 
the Fair Trade mark on their own-brand products (Bornhofft Moore 2010). In 2009 
Tate & Lyle converted its entire retail range to Fair Trade, "In terms of size and scale, 
this is the biggest ever Fairtrade switch by a UK company and it's tremendous this 
iconic UK brand is backing Fairtrade." (BBC News 2008). This lead to major 
chocolate brands such as Dairy Milk in 2009 and 4-finger Kit Kats being certified in 
2010 followed by 2-finger Kit Kats in 2013  (Nieburg 2012).  This has attracted a 
growing number of ‘for profit’ companies into other parts of the value chains such as 
importing and processing (Bornhofft Moore 2010).  
 
This has meant Fair Trade value chains vary. They started with 100% Fair Trade 
Organisations (FTO) such as CTM Altercato trading directly through associated 
World Shops. Then FTO value chains developed with corporate retail participation 
such as Divine and Cafédirect. Next were FTOs such as Agrofair supplying 
supermarket own labels. Then corporate-dominated licensee and retailers such as 
Starbucks coffee entered the market. Next, corporate retail dominated, but not 
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licensees, such as own label supermarkets products sourced from second tier 
manufacturers. This was followed by corporate manufacturers as licensees to retailers 
such as Cadbury’s converting major brands for general sale. Finally, corporations and 
plantations have developed where the control of the value chain remains the same but 
with adherence to Fair Trade standards and prices, an example being Dole (Doherty et 
al. 2012). 
3.1 Increased Sales & Awareness 
The main arguments for mainstreaming are these companies serve a different type of 
consumer than World Shops do and they are needed due to their superior economies 
of scale. This enables Fair Trade products to be sold at lower prices to a wider 
audience, thereby increasing sales which can have knock on effects such as greater 
brand awareness leading to higher global standards (Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008, 
Renard and Pérez-Grovas 2007). Renard and Pérez-Grovas (2007) argue that if 
mainstream firms do not grow the markets, then they cannot help small producers, 
and instead will join rival certifying schemes with much weaker standards.  
  
Mainstreaming has clearly increased sales in the UK, in 2006 Fair Trade sales were a 
third larger than the year before mainly due to big retailers such as Marks & Spencer 
stocking Fair Trade Goods (Teather 2006). Since then mainstreaming has had a larger 
impact with Cadburys in 2009 deciding to certify 300 million bars of Dairy Milk and 
its packaged cocoa. The hope was that as it was an “iconic British brand ... This does 
really set the pace for the mainstream industry” (Wiggins 2009a) and would 
encourage other mainstream manufacturers to follow suit. This has clearly happened, 
a good example being Nestlé converting their Kit Kat bars that added an extra 800 
million bars carrying the Fair Trade mark, thereby also increasing brand recognition 
(Nestlé 2013b). It has also happened in other products such as wine, the Co-operative 
Group has sold over 30 million bottles of Fair Trade wine and by 2011 this 
represented 60% of Fair Trade wine sales in the UK (Co-operative Group 2014). With 
supermarkets entering Fair Trade both stocking Fair Trade labels and having their own 
label Fair Trade products this opens up a large potential market with Tesco, as the 
market leader, taking nearly £1 in every £7 on the high street and wanting to be the 




Increased mainstreaming could be particularly helpful for LFTOs as Bondy and 
Talwar (2011) found that regular Fair Trade consumers were less likely to reduce their 
consumption due to global economic recession than conventional consumers. In the 
last global recession there was a significant impact on export markets with Non Food 
exports falling by 9.9% in dollar terms in India between 2001-2 (Economic Times 
2002). “Fairtrade sales have in contrast held up in the recession even despite other 
specialist products, such as organic food, have fallen. The amount spent by shoppers 
on Fairtrade products rose from an average of £1.39 to £1.42 per shopping trip in the 
12 months to September 2009.” (Wiggins 2009b). 
  
One methodology used by Doherty et al (2012) to measure the impact of 
mainstreaming in the UK is to compare it with similar economies where there has not 
been mainstreaming. The Italian and UK have similar populations and wealth 
distributions (Cowell et al, 2012). Their Fair Trade markets have similar backgrounds 
in churches and World Shops and in both dominant FTOs emerged early - Traidcraft 
in the UK and CTM Altromercato in Italy. However, they have taken very different 
routes with Italy predominantly remaining with the 100% Fair Trade model whereas, 
as noted above, Fair Trade in the UK has moved into other value chains (Becchetti 
and Costantino 2010, Davies 2007). This can clearly be seen in the difference in 
estimated retail sales of €76.36m in Italy and €2,044.93m in the UK in 2013 (FLO 
2014). Thus the UK Fair Trade market was nearly 27 times the size of Italy’s.  
 
France has a similar GDP and population to the UK and Italy and can be seen as a 
half-way house in Fair Trade terms (Doherty et al. 2012), as Fair Trade entered the 
mainstream in France 10 years after the UK but 10 years before Italy. France has 
estimated retail Fair Trade sales of €354.84m in 2013 (FLO 2014d). So France has 
four and a half times the Fair Trade sales of Italy but a sixth of the UK. This gives a 
clear indication that mainstreaming has helped increase the movement’s sales. 
 
There is also other knock on effects of these increased sales such as increased 
awareness of the brand and the movement (Renard and Pérez-Grovas 2007). This has 
clearly happened in the UK, in 2007 only 57% of British Consumers recognised the 
Fair Trade brand, by 2008 this was 70% which is interesting as this was when 
40 
 
mainstreaming started ramping up and by 2012 brand awareness was 96% (Mann 
2012, Just Food 2008). However brand awareness was only 47% in 2012 in other 
parts of Europe which could be due to less mainstreaming (Mann 2012).  
 
 It is hoped that with these increased sales and awareness, these Fair Trade standards 
become “global ethical standards” (Hira and Ferrie 2006), and there is some evidence 
of improved industry standards of fairer market exchange (Nicholls 2010). Doherty et 
al (2012) see this as proof that Fair Trade has succeeded in demonstrating that markets 
should reward socially just production and trading.  
3.2 Reputational Risk 
However some like Reed (2009) see mainstreaming “threatens key aspects of what 
many see as the original vision of fair trade—most notably a primary concern for the 
plight of small producers and the goal of developing an alternative approach to trade 
and development—and may even be undermining its long term survival.” The study 
shows the tension is clearly visible in how the definition of Fair Trade has changed 
from FINE in 1999 “at sustainable development for excluded and disadvantaged 
producers” to 2001 revise as “offering better trading conditions to, and securing the 
rights of, marginalised producers and workers—especially in the South”. The key 
difference being the addition of workers to allow plantations in plus neither mention 
“long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect” which is an 
IFAT principle. The study claims these changes were made to make Fair Trade more 
palatable for mainstream firms.  
Mainstream firms who have entered the Fair Trade Market have been accused of 
‘Fairwashing’ or ‘cleanwashing’, defined by Low and Davenport (2005) as “a range 
of ways in which marketing fair trade through mainstream distribution channels 
creates opportunities for commercial businesses to appropriate and regulate the 
terrain”  
Barrientos (2006) believes mainstreaming is an attempt by large corporations to cash-
in on these markets rather than reform their business model, buying a very small 
percentage of their coffee as Fair Trade and purchasing the rest conventionally.  An 
example often cited is Nestlé’s partner brand certified in 2005 represented 0.02% of 
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Nestlé’s annual trade in coffee (Verdier-Stott 2009). Despite Nestlé having 100s of 
brands still very few of them are Fair Trade certified, though this has slowly been 
increasing with the Kit Kat brands becoming Fair Trade certified. Another example 
cited is Starbucks getting accreditation for only 1% of its coffee in 2000 however this 
has grown to 8.4% of their coffee in 2013 (Starbucks 2014).  
There are also examples of consumers thinking all of a producer’s products are Fair 
Trade such as Green and Black’s. Originally Maya Gold was the only Fair Trade 
brand, however many consumers and even some Fair Trade shops thought the whole 
range was. However, this was addressed by all their brands becoming Fair Trade from 
the end of 2011 (Smithers 2010). 
 
Fair Trade roses are a good example of potentially misleading customers with Tesco’s 
entering with the Tesco press release “This is good news for producers, who will 
benefit from the additional sales, and good news for consumers, who will see a much 
greater choice of quality fairtrade products in stores” (Ransom 2005) and many 
thought these were from a small producer. However, the producers can be large 
international companies such as Osterian, a Dutch company which employs 4,500 
workers. Also consumers would have thought workers were not being overworked, 
but supermarkets often confirmed the volume of their orders late making it very 
difficult for producers to plan and supply effectively, leading to workers being forced 
into compulsory overtime (Lawrence 2005).  
 
It is thought that by not focusing entirely on small producers this blurs the difference 
between Fair Trade and rival certification undermining confidence in the label as 
more questionable conventional firms e.g. Nestlé join the movement (Renard and 
Pérez-Grovas, 2007). This has caused some of the early Fair Trade retailers to become 
disillusioned as they feel cheated by large corporations joining. A good example is a 
group of US coffee retailers in 2004 which dropped the certification altogether 
including Just Us Coffee (Rogers 2004, Just Us Coffee 2014). This disillusionment is 
a threat to consumers’ perception of Fair Trade. Bornhofft Moore (2010) suggest 
making it clear for consumers so that they can distinguish between a company that is 
100% Fair Trade e.g. Divine Chocolate and one that isn’t e.g. Tesco, and whether a 
producer is a co-operative or a large-scale plantation.  
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Just Us Coffee, Equal Exchange have transitioned to using producers who are 
certified by the Small Producers Symbol (SPP in Spanish) which distinguishes small 
producers “keeping true to the original concept of Fair Trade” (Just Us Coffee 2014) 
There are already 60 producers as members certified by SPP (SPP 2014). Other 
retailers such as CTM Altromercato have given up on third party certification by FLO 
as they do not feel they need it due to brand loyalty and are still the largest FTO in 
Italy, however they have kept their IFAT certification (Nicholls et al. 2004, 
Altromercato 2014).  
“When large, conventional plantations get fair-trade certified for improving practices, 
we consider that 'fair-trade lite” (Gogoi 2008). Doherty et al (2012) found an 
emergence of a ‘Fair Trade lite’ access to certification with nominal if any benefits to 
producers. 
There is danger that earlier entrants to Fair Trade markets are being side-lined (Mohan 
2009). A good example is Sainsbury’s which built a Fair Trade reputation and then 
switched to another cheaper supplier (Doherty et al. 2012). This, of course, is against 
the Fair Trade principle of fostering long term relationships. Smith (2009) found in 
reality that these relationships are now often for one season only or are ignored 
completely by major retailers.  This is important to quality and investment as early 
buyers are more likely to invest in quality. However, as the number of LFTOs has 
increased the newer importers are less likely to remain loyal as they can just change 
suppliers (Nicholls et al. 2004).  
3.3 Co-option Risk 
Critics of mainstreaming see that there is a severe co-option risk, “the process by 
which one group gains converts from another group by attempting to replicate the 
aspects that they find appealing without adopting the full program or ideals” (Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary 2011). This is not a new concept and was mainly used to 
describe government entities “neutralising the effectiveness of movements for social 
change” (Jaffee and Howard 2010) however is now more used to describe 
conventional firms trying to maintain the status quo. 
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This is to be expected as the majority of commercial businesses focus on low cost fast 
production. Renard’s (2005) study showed that this risks price reduction in the 
medium and long term if these newer entrants end up controlling this niche market as 
they could replace certification with their own criteria certified by other parties. 
However, there are some supermarkets such as the Co-operative Group in the UK 
which a have long history of similar values to the FTOs and have instituted ethical 
policies in its entire value chain.  The Co-operative has also worked in partnership 
with these early pioneers such as Traidcraft to bring new products to market such as 
Fair Trade wine which it enabled through a partnership with Traidcraft at a time when 
there was no FLO certification and more recently rubber gloves (Nicholls et al. 2004). 
Another success story is that of the Divine and Dubble brands from the Day 
Chocolate Company in the mainstream “showing that an alternative business model 
that challenges the conventional international trading system can work” (Doherty and 
Meehan 2006). One of the keys to this was creating innovative approaches bringing 
consumers and producers together to initiate change such as a fan club encouraging 
young people to lobby local shops to stock these and schools pack to increase 
awareness (Doherty and Meehan 2006). 
However, most other conventional firms may not have similar values to the Day 
Chocolate Company and the Co-operative Group. Due to the power of these 
conventional firms there is dilution risk (Acona 2004).    
3.4 Dilution Risk 
“When a label becomes mainstream, it’s on expansion mode and when that happens, 
the mission objectives blur, minimum standards of qualification if met satisfy the 
agencies, resulting in dilution at all stages” (Bornhofft Moore 2010).  
Dilution risk is where even core standards are watered down such that the Fair Trade 
authorities are influenced by actors to make decisions in their favour rather than the 
overall social good (Jaffee 2010). There are many Fair Trade authorities but FLO is 
the most significant followed by the WFTO. Because Fair Trade certification fees are 
based on a percentage of sales, so companies with the highest sales contribute the 
most to FLO and potentially have the most influence over FLO (Bornhofft Moore 
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2010). With Starbucks being the largest buyer of coffee globally, this raises questions 
about the influence it may have over Fair Trade Authorities (Guardian 2014b).  
Jaffee (2007) found the additions of mainstream companies weaken Fair Trade 
Organisations as they have less bargaining power and there is a dilution of the brand 
which could cause severe reputational damage to the Fair Trade Movement which 
undermines the Fair Trade Movement’s transformative potential (Moore et al. 2006). 
Doherty et al (2012) agree and found “significant evidence of lobbying to lower Fair 
Trade standards and slow floor price growth” which suggests regulatory capture.  
Regulatory capture in this case is where regulatory bodies (in this case the Fair Trade 
authorities) “make regulatory decisions in the commercial interest of those actors 
rather than the overall social good” Doherty et al (2012). 
A good example of this is Fair Trade roses, which were behind other products in the 
queue for the development of a FLO standard. Some believe Tesco’s interest in them 
led to them being fast-tracked. If this was the case, it shows the influence of Tesco’s 
on FLO and how other large retailers could undermine the movement. The Fair Trade 
Foundation’s response was that the standard had been in development since 1999 and 
that they had been sold in Switzerland since 2001 (Moore et al. 2006).  
Doherty et al. (2012) feel it was the pressure from the retailers such as Starbucks 
which allowed plantations to be certified. The argument for plantations is they can 
guarantee larger volumes and reliability than small farm producers and if plantations 
were restricted from certification this would restrict the growth of Fair Trade. 
However, there are many concerns with plantations not being in line with Fair Trade 
aims and by opening up Fair Trade up to them it will lead to lower Fair Trade 
Standards.  
3.5 Lower Fair Trade Standards 
There are already quite a few examples of Fair Trade Standards that seem to not be 
enforced from the Fair Trade minimum price not being paid, social premiums not 
being distributed, lack of long term relationships & pre-financing, indirect purchasing 
from producers. This is in addition to market data not being provided to producers and 
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the lack of democratic structures, consumer education and sustainable production 
methods. 
3.5.1 Fair Trade Minimum Prices, Social Premiums & Sustainability 
One of the central principles of Fair Trade standards has been minimum prices 
regardless of how low the market price goes which ensures a living wage for workers. 
It is intended to take into account the costs of production (land, labour, capital cost of 
sustainable production). The minimum prices should take into account a decent 
standard of living for workers and the costs of complying with Fair Trade Standards 
with some regional differences taken into account (Nicholls et al 2004). 
Besky (2008) found that Dhokebari a tea plantation in Darjeeling, India workers “do 
not receive a transparent floor price (minimum price received per unit) mediated by 
Fair Trade certifiers”. Weitzmann (2006a) found casual workers were not paid the 
legal minimum wages in four out of five farms visited in Peru. “The low pay issue 
wasn’t picked up in our audit because it wasn’t done at harvest season” (Weitzmann 
2006b) which casts doubts on the certification system. Valkila et al (2010) found even 
where the Fair Trade price is paid a much higher quality of coffee is demanded due to 
the glut of Fair Trade coffee and the power of buyers. 
It is also possible that power exertion by new entrants could lead to delays in floor 
price growth, such as cocoa prices following Dairy Milk accreditation. It is interesting 
to note that the Fair Trade coffee price has only minimally increased between 1989 
and 2008 (Jaffee 2010). Bacon (2010) found production and living costs have 
increased and there was a 41% real reduction in prices. This meant that many coffee 
farmers weren’t able to break even in the coffee crisis of 2005-6 with FLO minimum 
prices due to increasing costs so Fair Trade was further impoverishing them It’s 
interesting to note that although Bacon’s (2010) research contributed to the case for 
FLO to mandate a 7-11% minimum price increase there was objection to this from 
conventional firms and National Labelling initiatives. Whereas early adopters of Fair 
Trade Coffee such as Just Coffee and Equal Exchange lobbied for these higher prices 
and have established their own higher minimum price for coffee significantly above 
the FLO levels.  
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In addition to this there is a Fairtrade Premium this is “not optional, it is mandatory 
within Fairtrade contracts. Businesses are audited to verify the payment of the 
premium and producers are audited to check they have received it” (Lewis 2014). 
There are also worries that exertion by conventional firms could lead to lower floor 
prices. There is already precedence of tea social premiums being reduced in 2008 to 
make them more competitive. Bastian (2006) is worried that coffee minimum prices 
are under threat, however they are being raised to encourage producers to join to 
increase supply. However 78% of Fair Trade prices and premiums have been 
reviewed in the last three years including coffee in 2011 where the Fair Trade 
premium was doubled (FLO 2012). Blowfield and Dolan (2010) also question 
whether social premiums are being distributed properly. 
 
There also doesn’t seem to be enforcement of sustainable practices as  “using global 
satellite mapping, a Canadian NGO found that about one-fifth of all coffee production 
in one Fairtrade-certified association was illegally planted in protected virgin 
rainforest” (Weitzmann 2006a).   
3.5.2 Long Term Relationships & Market Data Provision to Producers 
Another principle of Fair Trade is that long term relationships are built on mutual trust 
and respect. This helps producers have a guaranteed income so they can plan and 
invest in their future productive capacity. However these are difficult to enforce with 
most standards only requiring 6-12 month contracts and no definition from FLO on 
what is a long term relationship (Nicholls et al 2004). Reed (2009) found that in some 
cases this was not even enforced for 6-12 month contracts. Utting (2009) found that 
some importers did not honour contracts if world prices moved against them. This is 
especially true for coffee producers as it is easy for an importer who experiences any 
problems to quickly switch to another. There is also concern that the retailers can 
quickly drop products leaving the risk with the importer so it is very one sided. Strong 
relationships with buyers have the added benefits of provide producers with quality 
and consumer feedback which they would not be able to receive otherwise (Nicholls 
et al 2004).  “Teaching producers how to evaluate and grade their own coffee helps 
farmers to understand what buyers might be looking for, and puts them in a stronger 
negotiating position. It also encourages continued improvement” (Macatonia 2014). 
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This is true of FTOs however because some supermarkets do not have direct 
relationships they don’t provide information to producers which is discussed later in 
this chapter (Doherty et al 2012). 
3.5.3 Pre-financing & Consumer Education 
Traditionally middlemen provided pre-financing on the agreement that producers 
would sell them their crops often at a low price. As mentioned in chapter 2 due to the 
seasonality of many Fair Trade crops small holder farmers need short term finance to 
pay for inputs. They were at the mercy of middlemen as most conventional lenders 
are unwilling to lend which is why the Fair Trade principles included pre-financing. 
Producers can request up to 60 percent of their contract, the buyer can charge interest 
on this but only up to their own cost of borrowing. Buyers “can lose Fairtrade 
certification if they deny producers access to finance without good reason” (Fair 
Trade Foundation 2015b). However this was inconsistently enforced and in 2008 this 
principle was effectively suspended. Some buyers such as the Co-operative have 
continued to pay these however some like Tesco’s and ASDA have not (Davies 2014).  
Some importers have even been known to pay late (Utting 2009). It is interesting that 
some mainstream traders provide better credit to farmers at significantly lower 
interest rates (Valkila 2009). Plus some supermarkets have reinstated pre-financing 
however few educate their consumers on the Fair Trade movement and product 
origins which is left down to the NFTOs and early FTOs (Doherty et al 2012). This 
may be down to supermarkets not knowing where the premiums are being spent due 
to their lack of direct purchasing from producers (Haight 2011).  
This change in consumer education has led to a change in consumption from early 
consumers having a higher level of action as they would have to seek Fair Trade 
products out from FTOs as they were not available in the mainstream (Bezencon and 
Blili 2010). This was known as the radical era of the 1980s to 1990s changed in 2000s 
to the pragmatist era when Fair Trade products became available in mainstream stores 
and consumers voted for them by buying them there and now has entered its passive 
era. (Doherty et al 2012) This is because consumers have to go out of their way not to 
buy some Fair Trade products e.g. if they are a Waitrose shopper who wants Non Fair 
Trade bananas they are going to have to go to another retailer as all there bananas are 
Fair Trade (Waitrose 2015). Low and Davenport (2005) see this has changed the 
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“message of Fair Trade from being a participant in international trade reform to 
changing the world by shopping”. The way they see this being avoided is by having 
the producers be shareholders and board members of the retailer e.g. Divine in the UK  
which they describe as radical mainstreaming companies. This ensures that retailers 
buy directly from the producers.  
3.5.4 Transparency & Purchasing Directly from Producers 
Another principle of Fair Trade is transparency so that “brand owners should be able 
to provide the full and direct supply chain of their produce” (Davies 2014). This is an 
important point as it allows consumers to see that they are buying directly from 
producers. This is a big selling point, as for certain products e.g. gold, traditionally 
there has been little transparency in this market and it has been obtained by dubious 
means including child labour (Frampton 2014). Another example is the fashion 
industry “where the supply chain makes it virtually impossible for consumers to know 
who made their clothes, let alone whether their garments were produced following 
environmentally and socially sustainable methods” (Panamas 2015). Direct 
purchasing and transparency has never been enforced as a principle (Doherty et al 
2012). 
 
Because of the lack of transparency in the value chain there have been cases of child 
slave labour being reported by Panorama (2010). They raised concerns that Kuapa 
Kokoo, a Cocoa LFTO in Ghana which supplies Fair Trade Cocoa to Cadbury and 
Divine had been using slave labour. Their response by the LFTO when notified was to 
suspend 7 out of 33 of their cocoa farming communities in 1 of its 52 major growing 
districts in Ghana. To put this in perspective they are supplied by 1,200 different 
cocoa communities and this is the only time that it has failed an audit of its farmers' 
practices in 15 years. The failed audit led to suspension of the LFTO which has now 
been lifted and the Fair Trade Foundation believe the suspension shows that the Fair 
Trade system is working. 
 
Since then the Geo Fair Trade Project has been established as a pilot scheme to ensure 
the credibility of the supply chain and to validate the Fair Trade good and sustainable 
practices. Consumers can use this new tool to access geo-specific environmental and 
social data about the products they purchase to give 100% transparency (Panamas 
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2015). To continue and cover all products and all producers this will need 
considerable investments. Other producers have their own systems in place such as 
Cooperative Coffee’s which has set up a Fair Trade Proof website to track coffee lots 
from farmers to roasters to consumers however these schemes would still need to be 
regulated (Fair Trade Proof 2015).  
3.5.5 Empowering Workers through Democratic Structures 
Another of the principles of Fair Trade is empowering producers since the 
introduction of plantations to the certification this includes workers. Workers describe 
“empowerment in terms of increasing levels of control or power of decision in 
hierarchical relationships on plantations and increasing control over their family 
economies” (Lyall 2014). From this it is clear that democratic structures are very 
important for worker empowerment. 
 
The Fair Trade standard for Hired Labour Organisations requires that workers form a 
Joint body which decides how the Fair Trade premium is spent, as well as a separate 
organisation on site which tackles workers’ rights (FLO 2014c). However, this can be 
very hard in practice to achieve with severe hostility between workers and 
management due to historical issues such as lack of property rights. Property rights 
are key to workers as it allows workers to gain independence from landlords giving 
individuals choice (Lyall 2014). Another key issue is wages which led to 500,000 
plantation workers striking in West Bengal (Bhaumik 2005).  
 
Where individual choice has been given there are examples of abuse such as in Upaja, 
a Fair Trade Tea Estate in Darjeeling. Their joint body gave funding to workers to buy 
community cows meant to produce milk as a supplementary income. However, some 
bought very small cows unable to produce milk and others sold off their cows so they 
could pocket the money. When workers were challenged by management on this it 
soured relations with management further (Bornhofft Moore 2010). 
 
Although FLO monitors the co-operative voting and implementing of these projects, it 
does not judge their decisions (Nicholls et al. 2004). Haight (2011) believes this can 
be a significant problem as premiums are “often not used for schools or organic 
farming but to build nicer facilities for cooperatives or to pay for extra office staff”. 
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FLO is now suggesting that there are discussions on how the money is spent rather 
than just doing these (Blowfield and Dolan 2010). 
 
There are also concerns there is very little upward mobility in plantations with many 
labourers’ children likely to also become labourers (Deepak et al. 2012). However. 
this has not always been the case in India with many workers’ children leaving the 
estate altogether (Staff 2006). For those who decide to stay working at the plantations 
there are examples of managers commonly being the children of tea pluckers at 
Chamraj Tea Estate in Southern India. This may well be down to providing free 
education for all workers’ children from primary to junior college. It is of note that 
both management and labourers’ children are educated together which is 
unprecedented, as well as there being 40 scholarships a year for higher education 
(Bornhofft Moore 2010).   
 
Where Joint Bodies had worked workers felt they had a stronger inner voice from 
being part of these meetings and from the training they had been given for this by Fair 
Trade Liaison officers on both technical skills and awareness about worker’s rights, 
health and social issues (Lyall 2014).   
 
Transfair USA is at the heart of this mainstreaming debate which hopes to “double US 
sales by Fair Trade farmers and extend Fair Trade benefits to millions of additional 
farmers and workers by 2015” (Just Coffee 2011). It parted from FLO in 2011 due to 
irreconcilable differences and has since renamed itself Fair Trade USA and created a 
label called Fair Trade for All with the aim to “adapt existing international Fair Trade 
Standards…and apply them first to coffee and then to additional categories over time” 
(Just Coffee 2011). This started with coffee allowing plantations to be certified and 
then moved into other products such as bananas, where “Transfair USA sidelined 
social movement participants to negotiate directly with number two banana giant 
Chiquita” (Jaffee 2010). The worry is that LFTOs will be undercut by the plantations 
due to their high volumes and economies of scale due in part to not having to look 
after workers as well as LFTOs have and thus LFTOs will lose market share (Jaffee 
2010). However a coffee LFTO in Brazil called Coocafe, have publically expressed 




Blowfield and Dolan (2010) are quick not to rule out plantations to Fair Trade as in 
the short term it would be very difficult to change the land tenure system. “Plantations 
are the legacy of an unfair system where the elite and the wealthy classes denied small 
producers their land, and small farmers always got the raw end of the deal," (Gogoi 
2008). Gogoi (2008) feels that conventional firms have taken the easy route to source 
from the plantations rather than identify the small farmers and buy from LFTOs.  
 
Many 100% FTO’s exceed fair trade standards whereas conventional firms are likely 
to avoid these if they are not enforced cutting their costs and giving themselves a cost 
advantage (Doherty et al 2012). This raises questions about whether Fair Trade 
Authorities have the resources to enforce standards as it is hard to monitor some 
aspects such as labour conditions in Colombia as workers are generally afraid to 
speak out and the more complex the supply-chain the harder it is to monitor (Gogoi 
2008). 
 
3.6 Global Value Chains 
Doherty et al (2012) examined the seven different types of value chain to see the 
propensity for co-optation, dilution or capture. They found there was no propensity in 
the 100% Fair Trade sold through world shops value chain e.g. CTM Altromercato. 
The FTO value chain with corporate retail participation e.g. Divine Chocolate had nil 
dilution but limited co-optation or reputational risk. The FTO supplying supermarket 
own label value chain e.g. Agrofair selling fresh fruit through supermarket branding 
has nil dilution, limited co-optation but high levels of reputational risk. The corporate 
dominated license and retailer value chain e.g. Starbucks has some co-optation of FT 
authorities and dilution of some principles with high reputational risk. The corporate 
retail dominated but not licensee value chain e.g. own label supermarket products 
sourced from second tier manufacturers had very high reputational risk, some co-
optation for Fair Trade authorities but limited dilution. In the corporate manufacturer 
as licensee to the retailer value chain e.g. Cadburys converting major brands for 
general sale they found high co-optation, dilution and reputational risk due to power 
imbalance.  In the corporations and plantations production they found high co-




Chapter 3 has looked at the benefits of mainstreaming of increased sales, awareness 
and the hope for higher global standards as well as the challenges of reputational, co-





Chapter 4: Impact Analysis 
Impact assessments are important to understand Fair Trade’s benefits and whether it 
lives up to its claims. This chapter looks at: farmer and household analysis; value 
chain analysis and LFTOs analysis. 
4.1 Farmer and Household Analysis 
 “Some critics claim that by focusing on achieving a fair price for poor farmers, the 
movement doesn't address issues of mechanisation and industrialisation - radical 
changes that might allow farmers in the developing world to stop doing back-breaking 
work and break out of the poverty cycle” (O’Neill 2007). 
Impact assessment has mainly focused on the ultimate beneficiaries of Fair Trade the 
individual farmers and their households generically known as “producer households” 
(Nicholls et al 2004). This looks at the immediate impact on households by Fair Trade 
and is motivated by the desire to assess size of relief of poverty. The majority of this 
analysis has been done on the coffee market. This may be in part due to the fact “Of 
the twenty product groups covered by Fairtrade International standards, 40% of all 
Fairtrade-certified farmers in the world produce coffee” (Montanez 2014). 
Murray et al. (2003) looked at Latin American Coffee farmers and found that Fair 
Trade has "in a short time greatly improved the well-being of small-scale coffee 
farmers and their families”. They had greater access to training which enhanced their 
ability to improve the quality of their coffee. Their children also had increased access 
to education. 
Jaffee’s (2007) study of southern Mexican coffee farmers showed they had higher 
incomes than conventional farmers but extra labour had to be hired to meet organic 
standards increasing costs, but overall this reduced household debts and enabled them 
to better feed and educate their children. There was also a multiplier effect of this 
increased income on the local community. 
Becchetti and Constantino (2006) looked at Kenyan coffee farmers and found “Fair 
Trade is definitely responsible for the creation of an additional trade channel, crop 
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diversification and provision of in-kind services including technical assistance”. It had 
also increased capacity, economic and social wellbeing, but more could be done to 
increase human capital.  
Arnould et al. (2006) looked at 1200 small scale coffee producers in Nicaragua, Peru 
and Guatemala and found Fair Trade had led to improvements in quality of life, 
health, education, material comforts, social participation, technical and social 
assistance, and even sustainable agricultural practices.   Fair Trade was also a buffer 
against volatile markets. “It is a safety net, but given current pricing levels, production 
regimes, and farm sizes, Fair Trade coffee alone is not THE solution to the problems 
of the rural poor” (ibid,). 
 
Berndt (2007) looked at coffee producers in Costa Rica and Guatemala finding that 
although it does help farmers hedge against market price volatility,  but it may 
“encourage the employment of scarce resources in high-cost, low quality growing 
areas that could find better uses than coffee production, thereby limiting the long-term 
success of the individuals it is attempting to help.”  
 
Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) surveyed 327 coffee farmers and found organic Fair Trade 
farmers have become poorer relative to conventional producers with organic coffee 
yields 43% lower. This meant their income was below the international $2 a day 
poverty level. 
 
Moberg (2005) found similar conclusions with Windward Island banana farmers who 
despite receiving higher prices did not have a net gain from Fair Trade when 
compared to conventional farming due to increased labour costs. This is very 
significant for the nation as up to 50% of the Windward Islands export revenue is 
from bananas (WINFA 2014). “A lot of farmers now know that Fair Trade doesn’t 
give him any more control over what he produces, how he produces it, or how he 
packages it. It’s a new kind of dependence” Moberg (2005). 
 
Isaac et al. (2012) see bananas as the staple of the island. “There is certainly no doubt 
about it - Fairtrade has saved the Islands. Without it we would be in desperate trouble” 
(WINFA 2014). However Isaac et al. (2012) also see the potential for diversification 
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in the Windward Islands such as into niche markets e.g. pink flesh bananas and 
processing bananas into a variety of products such as baby food and snack foods. 
There is also the opportunity of moving into agro-tourism. However, it will need all 
the stakeholders of the industry to be more proactive to achieve this.      
 
Overall, although Fair Trade farmers income increased so did their labour costs, 
however many were better off financially. They also benefited from protection against 
price volatility which meant more stable incomes. In addition to this they received 
access to health and training for themselves and their families. In some places such as 
the Windward Islands there are dependency issues but there is opportunity for this to 
change. 
4.2 Value Chain Analysis 
There is also a secondary level of analysis looking at the whole value chain, defined 
as “the whole cycle of the organisation, production and delivery of products from 
inception to use and recycling” (Kaplinsky 2004).  
Slob (2006) looked at the coffee value chain and showed that small holders received 
more income than they would have from conventional markets, approximately double. 
Even though they can only sell some of their product into the Fair Trade market: 
“Globally, only 6 per cent of Fair Trade certified tea is sold under Fair Trade terms” 
(Fair Trade Foundation 2012a). 
The minimum price, social premium, pre-financing and increased access to credit 
from Fair Trade helped the stability of producers. The study also looked at the non-
financial returns of training and technical support which enable farmers to improve 
the quality of their coffee as well as providing access to information which helps 
LFTOs make decisions e.g. when to sell or hold their products and helps strengthen 
their position. LFTOs are more able to diversify both vertically and horizontally than 
small-scale farmers due to the “stability of their organisations, their knowledge of the 
market and their growing awareness of the environmental aspects of their agricultural 




Valkila et al. (2010) also looked at the coffee value chain from Nicaraguan Farmers to 
Finnish consumers and found that the oversupply of Fair Trade coffee meant that 
“most marginalized coffee farmers cannot become Fair Trade certified” and that hired 
labours conditions changed very little. They found that “a larger share of the retail 
prices remained in the consumer relative to conventional coffee trade”. 
 
Gent and Braithwaite (2005) showed that cotton producers are at the mercy of the 
market. The supply chain is very complex and they have little control meaning they 
gain a very small amount of the value add with the majority being captured by “brand 
owners, large manufacturers and traders”. They did note that there is still more value-
added being retained in developing countries than other products. However, this goes 
to relatively few people which increases inequality. They feel more awareness is 
needed and Fair Trade is a great opportunity for this. 
 
A Fair Trade Foundation report (2012b) found certain factors limited the impact of 
Fair Trade including illiteracy amongst producers, landed properties, reduced power 
of influence and negotiation by producers within the chain, limited production 
volume, and restricted size of farms and market conditions. They suggest reducing the 
volatility of the Fair Trade Markets by balancing supply and demand including 
limiting the introduction of new producers until the current ones have reached 
sustainable growth, as well as ensuring that all members in the value chain are 
committed to principles of Fair Trade and avoid dependence on particular markets or 
high volume buyers. This is in addition to implementing a mechanism to help protect 
producers against currency fluctuations. 
 
Tuhvag (2008) looked at the coffee value chain and found Fair Trade inefficiency as 
Fair Trade importers don’t have the same scale advantages as conventional firms with 
some having to outsource roasting to them. “The greatest challenge for Fairtrade 
actors is to decrease consumer prices for Fairtrade coffee and to gain control over the 
whole commodity chain.” (ibid.)  
 
The value chain analysis showed that although income had increased, producers can 
only sell a percentage on the Fair Trade markets and a significant percentage of that 
price stays in the consumers’ home market. Financing and technical support helped 
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strengthen organisation and LFTOs were more able to diversify. There are also 
barriers to the impact of Fair Trade including illiteracy, limited product volume and 
inefficiencies which prevent them from gaining control over the whole commodity 
chain. 
4.3 LFTOs Analysis 
Little research has been done on LFTOs, even though they have a pivotal role as the 
buyers from the producer households and the suppliers to both Fair Trade and 
commercial buying organisations. 
 
Ronchi (2006) looked at Coffee LFTOs in Costa Rica and found “the failure of 
market power and low producer capacity was the underlying causes of the low share 
of coffee returns faced by producers”. They also found that Fair Trade strengthened 
LFTOs by improving efficiency.  
 
Imhof and Lee (2007) looked at Bolivian Coffee LFTOs and found that Fair Trade 
resulted in more stable incomes and that Fair Trade producers were more likely to 
participate in other income generating activities, such as taxi driving. Fair Trade did 
not improve formal education such as primary school education, however producers 
did have a broader understanding of the coffee market than their conventional 
counterparts. This is likely down to the quarterly training courses provided by the 
LFTOs which has also improved quality and efficiency. LFTOs also offered training 
in organic production enabling farmers to go into this market if they wished, as well 
as pre-financing and entrepreneurial training building up capacity. They also found 
that the Fair Trade premium had been spent on improving production facilities which 
had improved quality and was “positive in terms of capacity building”. 
 
Aguilar (2007) looked at Coraca, Irupana, a Bolivian Coffee LFTO which has caused 
structural change in the surrounding region. Fair Trade income has given stable 
incomes to members meaning they do not have to take children out of school and they 
can now go on to further education. It has also enabled the LFTO to build up working 




Ruben et al. (2008) looked at Coffee and Banana LFTOs in Peru, Ghana and Costa 
Rica and found that one of the main results was the strengthening of LFTOs through 
encouraging investment and asset accumulation. “The FT premium could further 
support this process if it is allowed to use premium funds for joint investment 
programs (in farmers’ cooperatives) or for the transition to co-ownership regimes (in 
plantations).” 
 
Taylor et al (2005) found that due to slow growth in the fair trade coffee market, some 
LFTOs are using their improved organizational capacities to seek new channels 
including Non Fair Trade and Local Markets. 
 
Bacon (2010) found that in several countries LFTOs have used Fair Trade as a tool to 
“gain direct market access and wrestle up to 30 percent of the coffee exports away 
from the transnational corporations and elite exporters that have controlled these 
channels since colonisation”. 
 
What is generally missing from these studies, however, is a fuller understanding of 
how these LFTOs work and develop their capacity. In this context, it is important to 
understand their ability to access markets, not just Fair Trade ones but also local and 
conventional markets to understand the full impact of Fair Trade and its potential.  
 
Chapter 4 has looked at farmer and household analysis; value chain analysis; LFTOs 





Chapter 5: Methodology 
Chapter 5 starts with an overview of the Shared Interest data. It then shows the 
methodology of how to answer the question of this study, “Are LFTOs reaching an 
efficient technology enabling them to compete with conventional firms or are they 
remaining dependent on Fair Trade?” This will be achieved by calculating sales 
growth rates over time for Fair Trade, Non Fair Trade and Local markets. Testing 
whether any differences in growth rates between markets are statistically significant.  
5.1 Data Overview 
This paper uses data from a unique database from Shared Interest Society Ltd. 
involving 25 LFTOs with between 6 - 12 years data. The LFTOs are spread 
geographically with 10 in Africa, 14 in Central America and 1 in Asia however by 
sales the majority of the data is from Central American LFTOs (94.89%) followed by 
African LFTOs (4.71%) and Asia only makes up 0.4% as shown in Table 5.1. 
 







America 98,198,659 94.89% 
Africa 4,876,660 4.71% 
Asia 410,140 0.40% 
Total 103,485,459 100.00% 
 
These LFTOs are not always able to sell all their produce into the Fair Trade market 
due to demand. Shared Interest therefore splits LFTO sales into three Channels: Fair 
Trade; Non Fair Trade; and Local shown by Table 5.2.  
 






Fair Trade 49,206,543 47.55% 
Non Fair Trade 48,679,195 47.04% 
Local 5,599,721 5.41% 




This shows the Fair Trade Market is only marginally larger (47.55%) than the Non 
Fair Trade Market (47.04%) with the Local Market making up the remaining 5.41%. 
 
The data can also be grouped by product sector for each LFTO. To ensure the 
confidentiality of participants they have been coded by number in Figure 5.3. LFTOs 
have been categorised by what they predominantly produce so LFTO 3 is categorised 
as a Food & Drink (Excluding Coffee) LFTO as although it produces candles the 
majority of produce is Brazil nuts. Similarly LFTO 8 mainly produces Non Food 
products such as Crafts and Clothes with some vanilla and spices so is categorised as 
a Non Food Producer. The full list of classification is shown by Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 LFTOs Classification 
LFTO Number Products Classification 
1 Honey, Blueberries 
Food & Drink 
(Excluding Coffee) 
2  Coffee Coffee 
3 Candles, Brazil Nuts, Oils 
Food & Drink 
(Excluding Coffee) 
4  Coffee Coffee 
5  
Dried Fruits and 
Vegetables 
Food & Drink 
(Excluding Coffee) 
6   Coffee Coffee 
7  Coffee, Cocoa 




Crafts, Wine Non Food 
9  
Textiles, Cards, Paper, 
Sugar Packaging, 
Clothes,  Vanilla & Spices  Non Food 
10  Textiles, Paper Products Non Food 
11  
Toys, Patchwork, 
Ceramics Non Food 
12  Bananas, Cocoa, Beef, Food & Drink 
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Milk (Excluding Coffee) 
13 Coffee Coffee 
14 Papyrus Paintings Non Food 
15  Soapstone Non Food 
16 Baskets, Batiks, Crafts Non Food 
17 Handicrafts Non Food 
18  Honey, Beeswax 
Food & Drink 
(Excluding Coffee) 
19   Pineapple 
Food & Drink 
(Excluding Coffee) 
20  Coffee Coffee 
21  Paper Products Non Food 
22  Coffee Coffee 
23  Coffee Coffee 
24 
Soapstone, Palm leaf, 
Wood, Banana fibre, 
Sisal, Jewellery Non Food 
25  Handicrafts Non Food 
 
By these classifications the product breakdown is shown by Table 5.4.  
 






Coffee 82,783,793 80.00% 
Food & Drink (Ex 
Coffee) 16,320,162 15.77% 
Non Food 4,381,505 4.23% 
Total 103,485,459 100.00% 
 
As Coffee makes up 80% of the data this has been grouped separately from Food & 
Drink which makes up 15.77% of the data with Non Food LFTOs making up the 




This study is looking to answer the question “Are LFTOs reaching an efficient 
technology enabling them to compete with conventional firms or are they remaining 
dependent on Fair Trade?”   
 
This study is unable to measure efficiency, competitiveness or dependence directly, 
however it can try and infer them from proxies. The proxy this study uses for 
dependence is an increasing share of sales being made through Fair Trade channels. 
 
If the growth rate of Fair Trade sales was lower than the growth in at least on one of 
the other channels, this supports the argument that Fair Trade improves 
competitiveness. 
 
If the growth rate of Fair Trade was greater than that of other channels, this  supports 
the argument that Fair Trade doesn’t improve competitiveness leaving LFTOs 
remaining dependent on it which is against Fair Trade’s aim of capacity building to 
empower workers. 
 
Results in-between where the growth rate was the same as the other channels would 
indicate that Fair Trade is not encouraging dependence nor building capacity and 
improving competitiveness. This study used the below hypotheses: 
 
H0: Fair Trade share is falling or stable  
 
H1:  Fair Trade share is rising  
 
These hypotheses were tested for the Coffee, Food & Drink (Excluding Coffee), Non 
Food and All Products Markets.  
5.3 Growth Rates Calculated Using Moving Averages 
 
Total share of sales through the Fair Trade Channels could not be used as a proxy due 
to the large difference in scale between LFTOs from the smallest with annual sales of 
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$77,136 to the largest with sales of $42,962,216 annually which would skew the 
results. 
 
An alternative is growth rates, which is the percent change in sales between one 
period and the next, the calculation used is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 Growth Rate Calculation 
   
  
Where: 
PR = Percent Rate 
VPresent = Present or Future Value 
VPast = Past or Present Value 
Source: Parker (2002) 
Growth rates are independent of scale, so can be used as proxies for sales shares. This 
is because if on average the growth rate of sales through Fair Trade channels is higher 
than other channels, the share must be rising for the average producer. 
 
These can be calculated over time by moving averages which help gauge long term 
trends by smoothing out noise from the data. Due to the data available a minimum of 
6 years of data was used to calculate the 3 Year Moving Average (3YMA). The 
arithmetic mean was used to calculate these simple moving averages. Where there 
were more than 6 years of data all data years were used in calculations by taking the 
first 3 years and the last 3 years to give the most accurate analysis. Shares of sales by 
channel were provided by Shared Interest’s annual reviews (an example is shown in 
Figure 5.6) and company accounts submitted by LFTOs (an example is show in 
Figure 5.7). 
 
Only year end actual sales were used and forecasts were not as in many cases these 
were likely to be unlikely to be achieved. Where breakdowns by channel were not 
available the annual review percentage split were used to calculate these from the 
total sales for that year. The splits by channel used for the moving average 
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calculations are shown in Appendix 1. In a few instances there was poor 
communication from producers which meant there was missing data. If one year’s 
data was missing and the average of the preceding or following years could be 
calculated this was utilised. 
 
Where possible the growth rates were compared for the Fair Trade, Non Fair Trade 
and Local Channels. Growth rates were not able to be calculated for all LFTOs for the 
Local Channels, where this was the case the Fair Trade and Non Fair Trade growth 
rates for all the LFTOs were compared. Then for all LFTOs which had growth rates 
for all 3 channels theses were compared.  
 












Figure 5.7 Example Accounts  
 
 
The majority of sales figures were in United States Dollars (USD) however LFTOs 
5,8 and 17 were in Great British Pounds (GBP).  GBP figures were converted to USD 
on the year end date of their accounts using exchange rates shown in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8 Conversion rates 










































  Source: www.fxtop.com 
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5.4 Significance Testing  
Significance tests were used to help determine whether any observed differences were 
likely to be due to random fluctuations or unusual enough that random fluctuations 
rarely cause such differences (statistically significant). 
 
The primary test undertaken was the ANOVA (analysis of variance) test which 
determines whether there any significant differences in the means (in this case growth 
rates) between channels (in this case Fair Trade, Non Fair Trade and Local) at the 5% 
significance level. If this was found to be the case one tailed t-tests would be 
undertaken, i.e. to see if FT sales growth is greater than the Non Fair Trade Market. 
 
The assumptions of the ANOVA test are: 
1. The dependent variable is continuous 
2. The independent variable consists of two or more independent groups 
3. There should be no significant outliers 
4. The dependent variable is normally distributed in each group 
5. There is homogeneity of variances 
6. Independence of observations 
(Laerd Statistics 2014) 
 
Based on assumption 4 all suspected outliers were investigated by going back to the 
source data to check whether they were calculation errors. If data could be corrected it 
was but if it couldn’t it was removed from the analysis. This led to the below 
exceptional treatment shown in Appendix 1: 
Table 2 (LFTO 13) there were only sales figures for 2007 and 2008 so a single years 
growth rate was calculated 
Table 3 (LFTO 6) – 2007 and 2008 sales data was missing so 2009 data was used for 
2007-2009 
Table 5 (LFTO 12) – 2005-7 sales data was missing so the growth rate of 2004 and 
2008 was calculated. 
Table 9 (LFTO 15) – 2006 and 2007 sales data were missing so the 2005 sales data 
was used for 2005-2007 
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5.5 Coffee Supplementary Analysis 
This study’s intention is to track actual sales to measure market share changes to 
determine whether firms are reaching competitiveness. However changes in price 
level over time tend to distort the sales, the coffee market like many commodity 
markets is known for its volatility in price and growth in quantity so supplementary 
analysis has been undertaken to attempt to correct this is by deflating the sales. By 
deflating these it provides the current or real value so trends are independent of any 
price movements. This supplementary analysis was possible for the Coffee Market as 
it made up of only one product and the majority of it is traded on LIFFE Market. 
However this is much more difficult for the other markets as they are made up of a 
variety of products with a much smaller percentage sold on world markets such as 
Bananas where only 14% are sold on world markets (Chambron 2010). This makes 
calculating price and volume indexes a lot more complex and there was not the data 
breakdown to allow this. If there was more data available for each individual product 
supplementary analysis could also be run on these. The coffee sales figures were 
deflated using the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) composite quantity (which 
is shown in Figure 5.9) & prices data (which is show in Figure 5.10). 
    
Figure 5.9 Exporting Countries Total Production 











Figure 5.10 ICO Indicator Prices 
Source: ICO 2013 
 
Then the method below was used to create the coffee deflators:  
1. Constructing an annual volume index for Coffee setting the first year to 100.  
2. Constructing a price index using the time-series for the average coffee price in 
each year, setting the same year to 100.  
3. Multiplying the price by the volume index (and dividing by 100) to give a 
current value index for coffee 
4. Deflate the original sales series by the current value index, for each producer 
by market channel. 









Figure 5.11 Coffee Deflators  
Coffee Index 








1998 108.95 100.00 99695 100.00 100.00 1.00 
1999 85.71 78.66 108143 108.47 85.33 0.85 
2000 64.24 58.96 130005 130.40 76.89 0.77 
2001 45.59 41.84 112913 113.26 47.39 0.47 
2002 47.74 43.82 107703 108.03 47.34 0.47 
2003 51.90 47.64 123109 123.49 58.82 0.59 
2004 62.15 57.04 106199 106.52 60.76 0.61 
2005 89.36 82.02 116153 116.51 95.56 0.96 
2006 95.75 87.88 111169 111.51 98.00 0.98 
2007 107.68 98.83 128350 128.74 127.24 1.27 
2008 124.25 114.04 116614 116.97 133.39 1.33 
2009 115.67 106.16 128622 129.02 136.97 1.37 
2010 147.24 135.14 122798 123.17 166.46 1.66 
2011 210.39 193.10 133355 133.76 258.30 2.58 
 
Chapter 5 has given an overview of the data and methodology used. Chapter 6 builds 
on this with the analysis of results.  
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Chapter 6 : Analysis 
Chapter 5 has looked at the methodology and data overview. Chapter 6 analyses the 
results for the Markets of Coffee, Food and Drink (Excluding Coffee), Non Food and 
All Products. 
6.1 Results  
Table 6.1 Average Growth Rates Comparison by Channel 
Sector FT3YMA  NFT3YMA  L3YMA  
Coffee-Deflated 
(FT/NFT/L) 39.01% 22.65% 60.65% 
Food & Drink - Ex 
Coffee (FT/NFT) 21.95% -4.43%   
Food & Drink - Ex 
Coffee (FT/NFT/L) 23.43% -0.42% -6.51% 
Non Food (FT/NFT) 3.50% 4.64%   
Non Food (FT/NFT/L) 1.85% -2.00% 1.60% 
All (FT/NFT) 19.29% 8.23%   
All (FT/NFT/L) 20.90% 8.63% 25.18% 
All (Weighted) 34.98% 17.97% 47.56% 
 
Table 6.2 ANOVA Test Results by Market 




Different F-Value F-Critical 
Coffee 
(FT/NFT/L) 0.256987145 0.05 No 1.450558809 3.4668001 
Food & 
Drink - Ex 
Coffee 
(FT/NFT) 0.247166534 0.05 No 1.510718235 4.9646027 
Food & 
Drink - Ex 
Coffee 
(FT/NFT/L) 0.190321679 0.05 No 2.215450579 5.1432528 
Non Food 
(FT/NFT) 0.842226806 0.05 No 0.040662938 4.3512435 
Non Food 
(FT/NFT/L) 0.748255603 0.05 No 0.294052829 3.4668001 
All 
(FT/NFT) 0.185526007 0.05 No 1.804168086 4.0426521 
All 





6.2 Coffee Analysis 
Coffee LFTOs show the greatest increase in the Local Channel shown by a 3YMA 
growth rate of (66.14%) followed by the Fair Trade Channel (48.99%) and the Non 
Fair Trade Channel (19.45%). I therefore accept the null hypothesis that the Local 
share is rising faster than the Fair Trade share for Coffee LFTOs. This is suggestive of 
the possibility Coffee LFTOs are becoming less dependent on Fair Trade and more 
competitive however this result is not statistically significant and hence we cannot 
have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
6.3 Food and Drink (Excluding Coffee) Analysis 
When only the Fair Trade and Non Fair Trade Channels are compared the Food and 
Drink LFTOs show the Fair Trade Channel growing fastest by 3YMA growth rate 
(21.95%) followed by the Non Fair Trade Channel declining (-4.43%). I therefore 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate that Fair Trade share is rising faster 
than the other markets. This suggests the possibility that the Food and Drink 
(excluding coffee) LFTOs are not reaching efficient technology and thereby not able 
to compete with Non Fair Trade producers meaning they remain dependant on Fair 
Trade Markets. However this result is not statistically significant and hence we cannot 
have a sufficient level of confidence in this result.  
 
When All Channels are compared the Food and Drink LFTOs still show the Fair 
Trade Channel growing fastest by 3YMA growth rate (23.43%) followed by the Non 
Fair Trade Channel declining (-0.42%) and the Local Channel declining further (-
6.51%). I therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate that Fair Trade 
market share is rising faster than the other markets. This suggests the possibility that 
Food and Drink (excluding coffee) LFTOs are not reaching efficient technology and 
thereby not able to compete with Non Fair Trade producers meaning they remain 
dependent on Fair Trade Markets. However this result is not statistically significant 
and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
6.4 Non Food Analysis 
When only the Fair Trade and Non Fair Trade Channels are compared the Non Food 
LFTOs show a slightly higher 3YMA growth rate in the Non Fair Trade channel 
(4.64%) than the Fair Trade Channel (3.50%). I therefore accept the null hypothesis 
that the Fair Trade share is falling. This suggests the possibility that Non Food LFTOs 
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are able to compete with Non Fair Trade producers and not remaining dependent on 
Fair Trade. However this result is not statistically significant and hence we cannot 
have a sufficient level of confidence in this result.  
 
When all channels are compared the Non Food LFTOs show a slightly higher 3YMA 
growth rate in the Fair Trade Channel (1.85%) than the Local Channel (1.60%) and a 
decline in the Non Fair Trade Channel (-5.54%). I therefore reject the null hypothesis 
that the Fair Trade share is falling and accept the alternate hypothesis that the Fair 
Trade share is rising. This suggests the possibility that Non Food LFTOs are not able 
to compete with Non Fair Trade producers and not remaining dependent on Fair 
Trade. However this result is not statistically significant and hence we cannot have a 
sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
 
6.5 All Products Analysis   
When only the Fair Trade and Non Fair Trade Channels for All Products are compared 
this shows the Fair Trade Channel growing the fastest (19.29 %) at more than double 
the rate of the Non Fair Trade Channel (8.23%). I therefore reject the null hypothesis 
that the Fair Trade share is falling and accept the alternate hypothesis that it is rising. 
This suggests the possibility that LFTOs are not able to compete with Non Fair Trade 
producers and remaining dependent on Fair Trade. However this result is not 
statistically significant and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in 
this result. 
 
When All Channels for All Products are compared this shows the Local Channel is 
growing the fastest (25.18%) which is significantly faster than Fair Trade Channel 
(20.90%) and the Non Fair Trade Channel growing at less than half the rate (8.63%). I 
therefore accept the null hypothesis that the Fair Trade share is falling. This suggests 
the possibility that LFTOs are able to compete with Non Fair Trade producers and 
reducing their dependence on Fair Trade. However this result is not statistically 
significant and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
 
The All Products 3YMA were weighted by the market breakdown by product in Table 
5.3 to account for the differences in the product make up of the sample. This shows 
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the Local Channel (47.56%) growing the fastest, followed by the Fair Trade Channel 
(34.98%) and the Non Fair Trade Channel growing at less than half the rate (17.97%). 
I therefore accept the null that Fair Trade market share is falling. This suggests LFTOs 
are able to compete with Non Fair Trade producers and reducing dependence on Fair 
Trade. However this result is not statistically significant and hence we cannot have a 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to fill a gap in the impact assessment of LFTOs 
literature through using data from 25 LFTOs from Shared Interest. This is significant 
research as LFTOs have a pivotal role as the buyers from the producer households and 
the suppliers to both Fair Trade and commercial buying organisations. The key issues 
are about the ability of LFTOs to achieve an “efficient technology” and diversify into 
other markets as otherwise they are fragile and may not be in a position to serve the 
interests of the producer households in the medium to long term.  
7.1 Reaching Efficient Technology 
The Coffee Market and weighted All Product Market suggests the possibility that 
LFTOs may be reaching efficient technology thereby reducing risk and becoming 
stronger organisations. This is important as one of the principles of Fair Trade is 
capacity building so that LFTOs are able to compete with conventional firms. This 
was not statistically significant which means no definitive conclusions can be made. 
The analysis is also suggestive of the possibility that Fair Trade Export markets are 
helping LFTOs compete better in local markets, however this result is not statistically 
significant and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
 
This analysis leaves open the question of the impact of financial, physical, human and 
social capital on reaching efficiency, which would need to be explored using a 
different methodology. As well as whether they have focused on improving efficiency 
or quality, upgrading in an existing value chain or moving into a higher one, again this 
would need to be explored using a different methodology.   
 
7.2 Remaining Dependent on Fair Trade 
The Food & Drink (excluding Coffee) Market and the Non Food Market suggests the 
possibility that LFTOs may not be reaching an efficient technology, and therefore not 
diversifying risk and so are remaining dependent on Fair Trade. This could make them 
fragile and may not be in the best position to serve the interests of the producer 
households in the medium to long term. This raises questions as to why they haven’t 
been able to reach efficient technology. Are they lacking financial, physical, human 
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and capital? Have they focused on improving efficiency or quality, upgrading in an 
existing value chain or moving into a higher one? However this, again, was not 
statistically significant and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in 
this result. 
 
One possible reason that the Coffee LFTOs have been able to reach efficient 
technology whilst the rest of the Food and Drink LFTOs have not is the difference in 
the minimum efficient scale. Coffee unlike the other industries is less vertically 
integrated which means the economies of scale are likely to be much higher for Food 
and Drink excluding Coffee LFTOs. Also Coffee was the earliest commodity market 
to be certified which could be a factor and further research should be undertaken in 
this area.     
7.3 Fair Trade Market Growing Faster than the Non Fair Trade 
One possible reason for the Fair Trade Market growing faster than the Non Fair Trade 
market could be that it pays a higher price.  
 
 Coffee prices have been as low as $0.45/lb whilst the Fair Trade price minimum in 
2010 was $1.40/lb. However with organic certification and social premium this is a 
minimum of $1.90/lb. Even when coffee prices hit a high of $3.09/lb, Organic and 
Fair Trade certification would pay a minimum $3.59/lb which is still a 16% premium 
(ICO 2012).  
 
Therefore there is more incentive for producers to sell products there until it is 
saturated. Historically the LFTOs have only been able to sell a percentage of their 
food, drink and coffee into the Fair Trade Market but as these Fair Trade Markets 
have grown this may be why the Fair Trade share is rising. Globally the Fair Trade 
Market is unlikely to be reaching saturation point at present as at most Fair trade 
products have 1% of each product’s global market share. However there are clearly 
some national product markets that could be nearing saturation e.g. Bananas in 




7.4 Local Coffee Market Growing Faster than Fair Trade Market  
The analysis showed that Local Coffee Markets sales are growing faster than the Fair 
Trade Market which may be due to increasing middle classes increasing demand for 
higher quality coffee in South America and population growth (Southwick 2014, FAO 
2010). Local Markets are also much more accessible than international markets as 
they have lower transport costs. Also LFTOs are not always able to get space on 
container ships due to conventional companies owning them so it makes sense to also 
sell locally.  This reduces their dependence on the Fair Trade channel and demand in 
local channel is likely to increase further as more is marketed locally such as one 
LFTO in the study who have developed a local brand.  
 
There is a possibility that the growth of Fair Trade has helped LFTOs access the Local 
market by helping them reach efficient technology. The support of buyers in the form 
of higher prices, social premiums, financing, training and feedback could have helped 
LFTOs improving efficiency and/or quality and upgrade in an existing value chain or 
move into higher value chains. However this result is not statistically significant and 
hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
7.5 Further Research Needed 
As with many studies data was an issue, there was some missing data so averages had 
to be calculated if possible. Plus there were a few cases where this was not possible 
which reduces the reliability of our calculations. The ANOVA tests results are not 
significant so no definitive conclusions can be drawn this may be due to the small 
sample size.  Also with our 3YMA calculations some LFTOs had only in the last 3 
years of available data entered the Local Channel which meant for some results we 
received #DIV/0! Errors which may explain why when only the Fair Trade and Non 
Fair Trade Non Food Channels are compared it shows the Fair Trade share falling. 
However when all three channels are compared excluding those LFTOs where there 
are #DIV/0! Errors this shows the Fair Trade share is rising.  
 
What is needed is more observations, these will increase over time at Shared Interest, 
so one possibility is to return to the same analysis in, say five years’ time. However 
other avenues should also be explored for this data such as FLO and other similar 
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financing houses such as Root Capital in the USA, which may be able to provide 
more raw data than was available from Shared Interest.   
 
This would help reduce the variation within the groups and would hopefully enable 
definitive conclusions to be made and therefore allow policy recommendations to be 
developed. Also with more data it may be possible to split each of the markets down 
further into individual food markets. This would then enable us to deflate these 
markets as done with Coffee. As without deflating them price changes could be 
distorting the trends. It may even possible to be split each of the markets down into 
regions to ascertain regional differences. 
 
Shared Interest has in recent years added two new markets channels to their data Fair 
Trade Organic and Speciality which would enable us in the future to also see how 
these markets growth rates have changed over time.  
 
To fully answer the question of whether they had reached minimum efficient 
technology, however, would require the data of the long run average costs of both 
these producers and their Non Fair Trade counterparts which most businesses are 
unlikely to share.  
 
This was not available for all LFTOs however for some it was showing that despite 
turnover had grown 2.5 times the net profit margin had fallen from 5% to 0%. 
However this was probably due to them building a dry mill which is a financial risk 
but will hopefully increase the net profit margin in the future as it should reduce costs 
and increase the price they are able to achieve for their coffee sold.  
 
Long run average cost data would also help determine whether there is a higher level 
of minimum efficient scale in the Food and Drink excluding Coffee Markets than the 
Coffee Markets. 
 
To fully answer the question of the impact of financial, physical, human and social 
capital on reaching efficiency, proxies could be determined for each and regression 
analysis could be run. Also in depth case studies would enable us to identify any 




To fully answer the question have LFTOs focused on improving efficiency or quality, 
upgrading in an existing value chain or moving into a higher one, you would need 
access to LFTOs strategy which they may not share. Nonetheless, a combined 
methodology based on the type of analysis conducted here with more data, and a case 
study-based method with a smaller number of LFTOs, might be a possible way 
forward. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this study was to explore whether LFTOs Shared Interest financed LFTOs 
had achieved an ‘efficient technology’ and diversified into other markets. Otherwise 
they are fragile and may not be in a position to serve the interests of the producer 
households in the medium to long term as they are remaining dependent on Fair 
Trade. If they are accessing other markets, it suggests they are reaching an efficient 
technology thereby reducing risk and becoming stronger organisations.  The findings, 
while not confirmed statistically, do suggest the possibility that Coffee and All 
Products LFTOs are reaching efficient technology, able to compete with conventional 
firms, thereby reducing their dependence on Fair Trade markets. There is also a 
possibility that the growth of Fair Trade has helped LFTOs access the Local market 
by helping them reach efficient technology. However this result is not statistically 
significant and hence we cannot have a sufficient level of confidence in this result. 
 
Why might Food and Drink (Excluding Coffee) and Non Food LFTOs not been able 
to reach efficient technology? 
 
Are they lacking financial, physical, human and capital? Have they focused on 
improving efficiency or quality, upgrading in an existing value chain or moving into a 
higher one? 
 
What is the impact of financial, physical, human and social capital on reaching 
efficiency? 
 
From these findings, the main implication for the Fair Trade Movement is further 
research is needed with a larger sample of data over a longer time period looking 
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deeper at the root causes behind these findings to determine the best way forward for 
Fair Trade policy. One possibility is rerunning this analysis in 5 years’ time when 
more data is available or looking for other avenues where data may be available such 
as Root Capital or FLO. A combined methodology based on the type of analysis 
conducted here with more data, and a case study-based method with a smaller number 






Appendix 1: Calculation Tables 
 
Table 1: Sales through Fair Trade channel (FT), Coffee 





2 1,336,086 3,761,323 5,305,140 9,723,051 8,644,717 10,844,386 2005 2008 41.08% 
4 1,229,860 2,226,400 2,510,260 2,564,502 2,575,760 2,975,683 2004 2007 10.80% 
6 831,993 1,196,771 2,340,470 8,098,269 11,442,783 14,806,813 2004 2009 51.04% 
7 1,612,081 1,829,326 2,476,835 4,810,264 5,814,759 8,100,905 2003 2006 46.81% 
13 263,549 693,535 1,302,788 945,848 1,127,445 2,659,101 2005 2008 27.94% 
20 1,073,510 1,627,569 2,347,342 10,522,486 8,577,491 11,312,044 2004 2009 43.21% 
22 48,254 151,625 357,373 1,330,364 1,843,681 2,455,802 2005 2008 116.18% 
23 140,821 220,939 343,867 10,810 11,333 11,637 2004 2008 -24.98% 
 
Table 2: Sales through Non Fair Trade channel (NFT), Coffee  





2 233,815 658,230 928,400 1,701,534 1,783,844 1,831,663 2005 2008 41.01% 
4 1,814,044 3,283,939 3,702,634 5,233,368 5,256,342 6,072,463 2004 2007 23.46% 
6 799,366 1,149,839 2,248,687 1,518,426 1,131,704 1,464,410 2004 2009 -0.39% 
7 4,079,477 5,727,556 9,540,648 18,038,490 21,805,346 30,378,394 2003 2006 45.64% 
13 0 0 0 335,616 525,318 0 2005 2008 56.52% 
20 1,052,040 1,595,017 2,300,396 792,015 1,608,280 2,121,008 2004 2009 -1.67% 
22 7,380 23,190 54,657 27,150 37,626 50,118 2005 2008 10.47% 
23 295,724 463,971 722,120 661,528 701,064 517,833 2004 2008 6.14% 
 
Table 3: Sales through Local channel (L), Coffee  




n L3YMA  
2 100,206 282,099 397,886 729,229 208,039 260,975 2005 2008 15.38% 
4 30,747 55,660 62,757 618,611 621,327 717,797 2004 2007 135.88% 
6 16,314 23,466 45,892 371,833 482,788 506,142 2004 2007 151.37% 
7 145,915 584,396 627,318 1,202,566 1,453,690 2,025,226 2003 2006 51.08% 
13 2,662 7,005 13,159 40,513 54,166 26,860 2005 2008 74.62% 
20 21,470 32,551 46,947 621,548 536,093 707,003 2004 2008 79.18% 
22 1,135 3,568 8,409 0 0 0 2005 2008 -25.99% 






Table 4: Sales through Fair Trade channel (FT), Food & Drink   




n FT3YMA  
1 263,350 241,740 305,500 1,332,448 1,580,206 2,685,172 2000 2008 27.32% 
3 162,064 74,625 478,969 573,710 667,835 660,537 1999 2008 11.47% 
5 388,714 378,590 417,913 485,763 542,996 717,775 2001 2006 8.06% 
12 2,051,484 2,447,426 2,629,368 2,010,464 2,080,566 2,383,327 2003 2007 -2.38% 
18 139,141 127,017 227,664 377,514 412,927 332,114 2002 2005 31.49% 
19 77,458 485,060 1,357,243 3,145,313 3,234,217 4,921,271 2003 2007 55.76% 
 
Table 5: Sales through Non Fair Trade channel (NFT), Food & Drink   





1 167,280 267,100 204,035 251,041 297,720 505,902 2000 2008 6.48% 
3 167,871 538,432 215,920 1,258,461 1,464,928 1,448,921 1999 2008 18.26% 
5 89,446 92,097 102,405 135,532 75,092 195,973 2001 2006 7.44% 
12 227,943 271,936 292,152 30,616 31,684 36,294 2003 2007 
-
87.58% 
18 32,806 82,814 51,663 0 0 0 2002 2005 
-
25.99% 
19 137,702 862,330 2,412,876 5,458,043 5,612,317 8,539,852 2003 2007 54.82% 
 
Table 6: Sales through Local channel (L), Food & Drink  





1 134,636 161,970 252,093 347,595 412,228 700,480 2000 2008 13.02% 
3 121,328 85,617 62,921 18,507 21,543 21,308 1999 2008 -6.57% 
5 0 0 0 0 1,887 0 2001 2006 #DIV/0! 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 2007 #DIV/0! 
18 18,029 6,380 14,219 0 0 0 2002 2005 
-
25.99% 
19 0 0 0 647,564 665,868 1,013,203 2003 2007 #DIV/0! 
 
Table 7: Sales through Fair Trade channel (FT), Non Food 
LFTO Year 0 Year 1  Year 2 Year n-1 Year n Year n+1 Year 1  Year n FT3YMA 
8 320,675 356,472 341,685 468,540 515,850 345,420 1999 2007 3.39% 
9 183,004 469,423 457,499 995,744 552,856 728,621 2002 2010 9.40% 
10 311,558 232,527 194,971 94,696 99,854 41,680 2001 2007 -9.04% 
11 27,000 5,000 40,144 133,614 20,722 13,202 1999 2008 9.81% 
14 21,000 13,000 17,000 25,494 40,167 51,350 1999 2007 10.94% 
15 34,489 48,811 53,000 15,000 35,700 53,800 2001 2006 -4.28% 
16 11,038 53,266 48,820 43,694 51,564 60,947 1999 2010 2.98% 
17 18,667 20,675 28,434 22,300 18,217 34,000 1999 2008 1.06% 
21 154,905 172,236 130,324 268,382 278,895 240,953 2002 2007 11.50% 
24 195,074 190,467 192,577 307,413 326,846 462,080 1999 2006 9.57% 
25 281,970 191,072 159,937 73,205 87,875 100,926 2001 2008 -6.81% 
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Table 8: Sales through Non Fair Trade channel (NFT), Non Food 





8 157,762 138,528 177,780 337,020 371,050 248,460 1999 2007 9.17% 
9 89,502 126,000 168,271 255,319 280,681 369,915 2002 2010 15.39% 
10 104,008 64,244 123,135 0 0 0 2001 2007 
-
12.25% 
11 130,000 73,000 39,725 0 0 0 2000 2008 -8.01% 
14 2,000 1,000 1,500 7,248 9,190 60,000 1999 2007 42.48% 
15 50,459 57,511 25,126 13,000 100,000 96,200 2001 2006 9.47% 
16 16,752 1,087 1,039 8,877 10,565 16,878 1999 2010 7.54% 
17 2,701 338 1,520 2,500 1,300 1,900 1999 2008 2.51% 
21 83,998 65,487 88,014 98,670 102,535 94,921 2002 2007 4.51% 
24 20,330 15,403 29,283 26,243 27,902 39,446 1999 2006 5.34% 




Table 9: Sales through Local channel (L), Non Food 





8 0 0 0 16,440 18,100 12,120 1999 2007 #DIV/0! 
9 0 0 0 25,532 17,011 22,419 1999 2010 #DIV/0! 
10 320,000 292,500 78,200 216,700 200,000 208,350 2001 2007 -1.52% 
11 94,000 228,000 115,830 208,985 32,412 20,650 1999 2008 -3.82% 
14 0 0 0 0 2,743 5,000 1999 2007 #DIV/0! 
15 1,556 1,686 1,450 6,000 6,000 6,000 2001 2006 30.85% 
16 10,536 11,295 4,606 7,221 4,383 4,552 1999 2010 -3.03% 
17 10,580 15,935 17,579 27,787 25,450 26,619 1999 2008 6.82% 
21 174,146 123,423 100,761 27,628 28,710 29,206 2002 2007 
-
12.29% 
24 98,967 82,974 84,485 41,238 43,845 61,986 1999 2006 -5.43% 
25 21,000 1,909 3,336 9,625 11,554 13,269 2001 2008 1.18% 
 
Table 10: Sales through Fair Trade channel (FT), All Products 





2 1,336,086 3,761,323 5,305,140 9,723,051 8,644,717 10,844,386 2005 2008 41.08% 
4 1,229,860 2,226,400 2,510,260 2,564,502 2,575,760 2,975,683 2004 2007 10.80% 
6 831,993 1,196,771 2,340,470 8,098,269 11,442,783 14,806,813 2004 2009 51.04% 
7 1,612,081 1,829,326 2,476,835 4,810,264 5,814,759 8,100,905 2003 2006 46.81% 
13 263,549 693,535 1,302,788 945,848 1,127,445 2,659,101 2005 2008 27.94% 
20 1,073,510 1,627,569 2,347,342 10,522,486 8,577,491 11,312,044 2004 2009 43.21% 
22 48,254 151,625 357,373 1,330,364 1,843,681 2,455,802 2005 2008 116.18% 
23 140,821 220,939 343,867 10,810 11,333 11,637 2004 2008 -24.98% 
1 263,350 241,740 305,500 1,332,448 1,580,206 2,685,172 2000 2008 27.32% 
3 162,064 74,625 478,969 573,710 667,835 660,537 1999 2008 11.47% 
5 388,714 378,590 417,913 485,763 542,996 717,775 2001 2006 8.06% 
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12 2,051,484 2,447,426 2,629,368 2,010,464 2,080,566 2,383,327 2003 2007 -2.38% 
18 139,141 127,017 227,664 377,514 412,927 332,114 2002 2005 31.49% 
19 77,458 485,060 1,357,243 3,145,313 3,234,217 4,921,271 2003 2007 55.76% 
8 320,675 356,472 341,685 468,540 515,850 345,420 1999 2007 3.39% 
9 183,004 469,423 457,499 995,744 552,856 728,621 2002 2010 9.40% 
10 311,558 232,527 194,971 94,696 99,854 41,680 2001 2007 -9.04% 
11 27,000 5,000 40,144 133,614 20,722 13,202 1999 2008 9.81% 
14 21,000 13,000 17,000 25,494 40,167 51,350 1999 2007 10.94% 
15 34,489 48,811 53,000 15,000 35,700 53,800 2001 2006 -4.28% 
16 11,038 53,266 48,820 43,694 51,564 60,947 1999 2010 2.98% 
17 18,667 20,675 28,434 22,300 18,217 34,000 1999 2008 1.06% 
21 154,905 172,236 130,324 268,382 278,895 240,953 2002 2007 11.50% 
24 195,074 190,467 192,577 307,413 326,846 462,080 1999 2006 9.57% 
25 281,970 191,072 159,937 73,205 87,875 100,926 2001 2008 -6.81% 
 
Table 11: Sales through Non Fair Trade channel (NFT), All Products  





2 233,815 658,230 928,400 1,701,534 1,783,844 1,831,663 2005 2008 41.01% 
4 1,814,044 3,283,939 3,702,634 5,233,368 5,256,342 6,072,463 2004 2007 23.46% 
6 799,366 1,149,839 2,248,687 1,518,426 1,131,704 1,464,410 2004 2009 -0.39% 
7 4,079,477 5,727,556 9,540,648 18,038,490 21,805,346 30,378,394 2003 2006 45.64% 
13 0 0 0 335,616 525,318 0 2005 2008 56.52% 
20 1,052,040 1,595,017 2,300,396 792,015 1,608,280 2,121,008 2004 2009 -1.67% 
22 7,380 23,190 54,657 27,150 37,626 50,118 2005 2008 10.47% 
23 295,724 463,971 722,120 661,528 701,064 517,833 2004 2008 6.14% 
1 167,280 267,100 204,035 251,041 297,720 505,902 2000 2008 6.48% 
3 167,871 538,432 215,920 1,258,461 1,464,928 1,448,921 1999 2008 18.26% 
5 89,446 92,097 102,405 135,532 75,092 195,973 2001 2006 7.44% 
12 227,943 271,936 292,152 30,616 31,684 36,294 2003 2007 
-
87.58% 
18 32,806 82,814 51,663 0 0 0 2002 2005 
-
25.99% 
19 137,702 862,330 2,412,876 5,458,043 5,612,317 8,539,852 2003 2007 54.82% 
8 157,762 138,528 177,780 337,020 371,050 248,460 1999 2007 9.17% 
9 89,502 126,000 168,271 255,319 280,681 369,915 2002 2010 15.39% 
10 104,008 64,244 123,135 0 0 0 2001 2007 
-
12.25% 
11 130,000 73,000 39,725 0 0 0 2000 2008 -8.01% 
14 2,000 1,000 1,500 7,248 9,190 60,000 1999 2007 42.48% 
15 50,459 57,511 25,126 13,000 100,000 96,200 2001 2006 9.47% 
16 16,752 1,087 1,039 8,877 10,565 16,878 1999 2010 7.54% 
17 2,701 338 1,520 2,500 1,300 1,900 1999 2008 2.51% 
21 83,998 65,487 88,014 98,670 102,535 94,921 2002 2007 4.51% 
24 20,330 15,403 29,283 26,243 27,902 39,446 1999 2006 5.34% 





Table 12: Sales through Local channel (L), All Products  




n L3YMA  
2 100,206 282,099 397,886 729,229 208,039 260,975 2005 2008 15.38% 
4 30,747 55,660 62,757 618,611 621,327 717,797 2004 2007 135.88% 
6 16,314 23,466 45,892 371,833 482,788 506,142 2004 2007 151.37% 
7 145,915 584,396 627,318 1,202,566 1,453,690 2,025,226 2003 2006 51.08% 
13 2,662 7,005 13,159 40,513 54,166 26,860 2005 2008 74.62% 
20 21,470 32,551 46,947 621,548 536,093 707,003 2004 2008 79.18% 
22 1,135 3,568 8,409 0 0 0 2005 2008 -25.99% 
23 32,858 51,552 80,236 66,896 70,894 52,365 2004 2008 3.67% 
1 134,636 161,970 252,093 347,595 412,228 700,480 2000 2008 13.02% 
3 121,328 85,617 62,921 18,507 21,543 21,308 1999 2008 -6.57% 
5 0 0 0 0 1,887 0 2001 2006 #DIV/0! 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 2007 #DIV/0! 
18 18,029 6,380 14,219 0 0 0 2002 2005 -25.99% 
19 0 0 0 647,564 665,868 1,013,203 2003 2007 #DIV/0! 
8 0 0 0 16,440 18,100 12,120 1999 2007 #DIV/0! 
9 0 0 0 25,532 17,011 22,419 1999 2010 #DIV/0! 
10 320,000 292,500 78,200 216,700 200,000 208,350 2001 2007 -1.52% 
11 94,000 228,000 115,830 208,985 32,412 20,650 1999 2008 -3.82% 
14 0 0 0 0 2,743 5,000 1999 2007 #DIV/0! 
15 1,556 1,686 1,450 6,000 6,000 6,000 2001 2006 30.85% 
16 10,536 11,295 4,606 7,221 4,383 4,552 1999 2010 -3.03% 
17 10,580 15,935 17,579 27,787 25,450 26,619 1999 2008 6.82% 
21 174,146 123,423 100,761 27,628 28,710 29,206 2002 2007 -12.29% 
24 98,967 82,974 84,485 41,238 43,845 61,986 1999 2006 -5.43% 
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